

PROCEEDINGS



THE FIRST POLITICAL SCIENCE STUDENTS' CONFERENCE MODEL

5TH OF MARCH,
2020





The British University in Egypt
Faculty of Business Administration,
Economics and Political Science (BAEPS)
The Political Science Department

PROCEEDINGS

The First Political Science Students’ Conference Model

5 March 2020

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Dean's Word

It is my pleasure to introduce this edited volume on the proceedings of the first model of a students' conference, which was held on 5 March 2020 under the auspice of Prof. Ahmed Hamad, President of the British University in Egypt (BUE).

I am particularly proud of the Political Science Department for taking this initiative to organize a students' conference, which is a pioneer initiative on both faculty and university levels. It shows the hard work of all Political Science staff members and it brings the teaching and learning process to a higher practical level. I am especially pleased with the performance of participating students in this conference, which is indeed promising. The level of commitment, seriousness and professionalism that this experience reflected in its first application in 2020 is indeed remarkable and sets a model for future organization of similar events.

Prof. Wadouda Badran

**Dean of the Faculty of Business Administration,
Economics, and Political Science (BAEPS)**

Vice-Dean for Teaching and Learning's Word

It is my pleasure as Vice-Dean for Teaching and Learning to introduce these proceedings, which are the outcome of the first students' conference model in the Faculty of BAEPS. I would like to congratulate the Political Science Department for this intriguing initiative. Launching a students' conference is indeed a significant contribution to the teaching and learning process and it complements the high-quality education provided by the Department.

The PSCM would not have taken place without the constant support of the BUE President, Professor Ahmed Hamad, and our BAEPS Dean, Professor Wadouda Badran, to such constructive extra-curricular activities. Also, this event would not have achieved such success without the dedication, commitment and hard work of the Head of the Political Science Department, Professor Amany Khodair and all Political Science Module Leaders, Teaching Assistants and students.

I am looking forward to many more proceedings of this conference in the coming years. With my best wishes and deep appreciation to the Political Science Department.

Prof. Hadia FakhreEldin
Vice-Dean for Teaching and Learning

Head of Department's Word

I am delighted and proud to introduce these proceedings of the first Political Science Students' Conference Model (PSCM), which has been a successful experience in every aspect. It is a practical translation of the department focus on research-oriented education and a manifestation of the high-quality teaching provided by all staff members in the department, especially when noting that all essays in this volume are presented and written by undergraduate students from different degree years.

The experience of the first PSCM has been very enriching to the students whether they acted as essay-presenters, contributors to the organization of the conference, participants in the conference discussions, or simply listeners and observers of various sessions. The department believes that the PSCM experience is very important in acquainting undergraduate students to the experience of writing, presenting and discussing a paper at an academic conference. Hence, the department is determined to make the PSCM an inherent component of its annual activities in the academic years to come.

I am especially thankful to Prof. Ahmed Hamed, BUE President, Prof. Wadouda Badran, BAEPS Dean, and Prof. Hadia Fakhreldin, Vice-Dean for Teaching and Learning for their continuous support and encouragement to the Political Science Department and its initiatives. Also, I am extending my sincere appreciation to all members of the department, especially those who took part in the organizing committee and those who acted as session chairs and discussants, for without their devotion and enthusiasm this work would not have been possible. My earnest gratitude goes to Prof. Ali eldin Hillal, Egypt's notable political scientists, for honoring this conference with his presence and comments. I am also indebted to Dr. Mostafa Abo-elSoud for supporting the department throughout the implementation phase of this conference.

Prof. Amany Khodair

Head of the Political Science Department

Editor's Introduction

This volume grew out of the first Political Science Conference Model, a first such model in the Faculty of BAEPS and the entire university. It encompasses a variety of undergraduate students' essays that were subject to prior evaluation by an academic committee. The committee received more than 50 essays and carefully selected the twelve essays included in this volume for the eventual presentation and discussion in the first PSCM held on March 5, 2020.

It is essential to stress that essay presenters are all students from the undergraduate level, ranging from sophomore, junior and senior students, who were all encouraged to submit either especially prepared essays or even revised versions of their own essays that were previously authored and submitted to fulfil the requirements of specific modules. These include modules on Modern Political Theory, Political Thought, International Relations Theory, Gender and Politics, Foreign Policy Analysis, Sub-Saharan Africa, Rise of Asia, and Global Political Economy. Thus, these facts (i.e. that the majority of presented essays are authored by students from various undergraduate levels and with the purpose of addressing the specific requirements of single modules) are reflected on the level of knowledge attainment, writing skills, academic thoroughness, and overall academic quality of essays. That said, it is important to note that several essays in this volume fell-short from being academically rigorous due to downfalls in academic writing and other common undergraduate-related flaws in proving causality, making inferences, and avoiding bias and single-factor explanations. These issues characterized the overall comments of essay-discussants as well as the following academic debates in each of the three conference sessions. However, with all such flaws in mind, it is equally important to stress that the twelve essays in this volume bring into focus a variety of distinguished topics in a reasonable academic manner that is indeed promising. Besides, the Department decision to publish this edited volume aims primarily at encouraging students to do research and to be increasingly acquainted with the experience of participating in academic conferences, which are more important educational goals at that stage of students' lives compared to disseminating their research findings.

The twelve essays in this volume are categorized in three parts: the first includes four essays on ideas, theories and practical issues related mostly to international interactions; the second includes four essays on various foreign interventions and practices; while the third includes four essays on issues related broadly to the field of human rights. The twelve essays provide interesting perspectives and fresh views on how undergraduate students can analytically approach a variety of sophisticated issues

such as secularism, the evolving role of non-state actors on the world stage, the rise of China, the neo-mercantilist practices of the European Union, human trafficking, Islamophobia, nationalism and ethnic cleansing.

It is a pleasure to present this volume of students' essays, in which I intervened minimally as an editor to maintain the under-graduate students' character, with all their strengths and weaknesses. The department takes pride in publishing these essays with minor editing since the PSCM is suitably assessed as an educational experience that trains and prepares students to become promising researchers.

Prof. Sally Khalifa Isaac
Professor of Political Science

Part I

International Interactions: Ideas, Theories and Policies

Secularism between the East and the West: Reflections on Taha Hussein's Secular Thought and French Secularism

Fatemah Mohamed Mosaad Hussein

Introduction:

Secularism is a contested concept. Although very prevalent in western contexts, secularism is still highly debated in the Muslim world. The paper examines Taha Hussein's theoretical contributions to secularism as one of the most influential Arab thinkers in secularist thought. The purpose of the paper is to compare western secularism with Taha Hussein's secular framework, particularly focusing on the radical French secular system "Laïcité" in a trial to highlight the main disparities between eastern and western secular thought. The paper argues that Taha Hussein's secular ideas differ from the French secular system in three areas: first, the role of religion in creating national consciousness, second, the public display of religion, and third, the position of religion in the educational system. Accordingly, the paper is classified into four sections. The first section defines secularism highlighting the historical evolution of the concept and different secular stances. The second section reviews some western and eastern scholarly contributions to the idea of secularism (Najjar, 1996). The third section then goes through Taha Hussein's secular framework, starting with the social and political context Hussein was raised in, passing by his secular thought in relation to Egyptian nationalism, ending with the role of religion in the educational reforms he advocated for. The last section reviews France's secular system starting with the historical origin of "Laïcité", passing by the main differences between the application of 'Laïcité' and Taha Hussein's secularism.

The selection of Taha Hussein specifically is not only attributed to the fact that Hussein is an influential figure in the modernist movement of the middle east, and a prominent figure within the eastern line of thought that introduced secularism to the region (Hourani, 1962). But also, an Arab scholar that shows strong adherence and commitment to western values and culture. As Hourani (1965) stated, to Hussein "Europe is a repository of true ideas" (p.328). Nevertheless, an examination of Hussein's thought leads to the finding that even in the writings of one of the most committed thinkers to western principles, and one of the strongest advocates for modernization on the western path (Ansari, 1960), a proposition of a distinct and more moderate form of secularism is apparent compared to more radical western secular systems. The selection of the French secular system 'laïcité' to compare Hussein's thought with is due to the fact that laïcité is one of the most developed and long-established secular systems in the west. And furthermore, its radicalism would help shedding light on the more diluted secular form promoted by Taha Hussein.

Secularism: Conceptual Framework

Secularism as a concept has always been a source of debate and controversy. From historical perspective, Secularism was first referred to implicitly during the Westphalian treaty 1648, which marked the formation of secular nation states (Alrawashdeh, 2014). The term scientifically emerged as a concept by George Holyoake in mid-19th century, in which he used terms as 'secular' 'secularization' and 'secularism' in his journal 'the reasoner'. Secularism is initially defined as the separation between religion and politics or more specifically, the separation between church and state where the concept has its western Christian context (Topal, 2012). Stephan (1987) perceives secularism as the allowance to use any set of beliefs, other than religious beliefs, in the public sphere. Jean Baur bent, French secular sociologist, defined secularism as the total separation between religious institutions and state institutions. (Kateb,2009). Charles Taylor (2011) added to this by arguing that besides the state-church separation, secularism emphasizes that state should embrace neutral stance in regards to religious difference in multicultural society (as cited in Bigrami,2012). More comprehensively, Moddod (2012) defined it as an institutional arrangement in which political authorities is distinguished from religious authorities, as Scherer (2011) put it "secularism is the separation that makes religion private while making power and reason public" (p.623).

Although these definitions constituted the general framework for secularism. There are degrees of variations in the concept from one context to the other. As Bigrami (2012) put it secularism is a contextual concept that differs in application from society to another. For instance, secularism, on a spectrum, may range from radical to moderate. As Shepard (1987) pointed out that secularism may take a radical path when advocating for replacement of religion in both public and private spheres. However, far more prevalent is the moderate form of secularism in which religion is separated from politics in Public sphere. Furthermore, Kuru (2008) Differentiated between what he called 'assertive secularism' and 'passive secularism'. Where the first implies the total absence of religion from the public sphere while the latter permits the public display of religion.

Literature Review: Western and Eastern Scholarly Contributions

In the western context, Secularism has its origins and roots back to the 17th century, particularly, in the work of prominent western philosophers such as Rousseau, Montesquieu, Hegel and John Locke. For instance, Hegel once stated that "secular life is a definite embodiment of spiritual kingdom" (Scherer, 2011). Jose Casanovo (1994) added that major events like the creation of modern states, the protestant revolution, and the emergence of capitalism are what marked the evolution of secularism in the western context (as cited in Topal, 2012). However, the development of secularism as an ideology did not appear till late 19th century (Kateb, 2009).

George Jacob Holyoake was one of the prominent western secular ideologues during 1850's. Holyoake perceived secularism as a set of utilitarian ethics that ensure human progress through reason and knowledge (Wu, 2007). To Holyoake, secularism is a 'line of demarcation' between what is spiritual and what is material. However, Holyoake did not advocate for radical secularism or total abolition of the religion but rather, for a system where religion is superseded by scientific systems (Rectenwald, 2013). Following Holyoake, Charles Bradlaugh went more radically in his advocacy for secularism. In his book "Doubts in Dialogue" he presents a critic to all religions (Wu,2007). Influenced by atheism, he argued that Christianity is an impediment to human development, while secularism on the other hand, would ensure human progress by its emphasis on materialism and utilitarianism. Moreover, Bradlaugh had established the 'national security society' that prevailed in Europe calling for secularism during 1880's (Arnston, 1957).

On the other side, secularism appeared in Muslim Arab Countries in late 19th and 20th centuries. What is necessary to highlight is that secularism in the eastern context differed considerably from the western context, partly due to different historical and political trajectories. As Masud (2005) stated that secularism in Muslim world is perceived as a "politico-religious Ideology" (p.363). Furthermore, the term secularism emerged in post-colonial context associated with other ideas as modernization, rationality, and democracy (Masud,2005).¹

Secularism started with Christian Arab secularists such as Farah Anton, and Salama Musa. Influenced by French thinkers and Arab thinkers alike, The Lebanese scholar Farah Antun called for secularism arguing that tension between religion and secularism would be dissolved if each operated in its own sphere, and added that secular state is founded on the separation between the emotional power and worldly powers (Wu,2007) (Alrawashdeh, 2014). Influenced by Antun, Salama Musa went far more extreme arguing that religion is the source of all crisis in the east (Wu,2007).

Influenced by secular Arab Christians, secular Arab Muslims developed their secular thought. Al Kwakbi is regarded as the first to put the seeds of secularism, in his book 'um al Qura' he called for the separation between religion and state. The idea that was furtherly elaborated in 'Taba'I al istbdad' as he stated that the Caliph is necessary, not as a political authority but rather a spiritual figure (Wu,2007). Similarly, Ali Abdelrazik in his book "al Islam wa usul al Hukm" questioned the position of the caliphate arguing that Islam should not be associated, by any means, with the political ruling system (Najjar,1996). Following Abdelrazik, Farag Foda, another secular advocate, called for the

¹ While secularism in the west was more radically pursued by being associated with the reformation movement, the protestant revolution and the call for diminishing the rule of the church, secularism in the east was introduced with modernization waves in the writings of intellectuals influenced by western cultures (Wu, 2007), an era that witnessed new ideological constructions (Masud, 2005).

separation between religious and political spheres arguing that historical evidence revealed that the combination between the two breeds intolerance and violence (Najjar,1996). More recently, Fouad Zakaria, a famous secularist, pointed out that rationalism is the intellectual base of secularism, advocating for the separation between religion and state (Wu,2007).

Influenced by these Secular intellectuals was the pioneering influential thinker Taha Hussein. Taha Hussein ought to be examined not only for his own significant character but also because his thought marked the final contributions to this line of thought (Hourani, 1962).

Taha Hussein and Secularism: Theoretical Framework

Taha Hussein was raised in a poor family in upper Egypt. He suffered from blindness in early age due to the backwardness of the rural society he was raised in (Aylon,2009). He managed to memorize the quran in an early age, and then was sent to al-Azhar where he was exposed to heavy religious study. Later on, he joins the Egyptian university as one of its early students, where he learned more about western scholars and philosophers, and due to his academic achievements, Hussein was sent to France for education, where he got in contact with great European thinkers (Ali,2017).

Not only did these different educational backgrounds is what shaped Hussein's thought, but also the Egyptian political context, he witnessed, marked the significance of his philosophy. That era witnessed the 1936 Egyptian Treaty, that ended the British colonialism and marked the era of national independence (Ali, 2017). The general theme that shaped this period was the question of how to build the nation and what are the bases of the national life (Hourani, 1962). In that context, Taha Hussein's thought was stimulated by the need to achieve both national strength and national unity (Shepard, 1987).

Influenced by this context, Taha Hussein in 1938 published his controversial book "the future of culture in Egypt". In which he appeared to be highly influenced by the west and had strongly advocated Egypt's following of the western path (Ali, 2017). Moreover, he argued that Egypt is Closest to the west than to the orient. As Ansari (1960) pointed out that Hussein had stressed on the similarity between the Egyptian and the European mindset, highly advocating for modernization on the western path.

Highly influenced by the west, Hussein developed his secular thought. As Hourani (1962) pointed out that Hussein perceive reason and Knowledge as the foundation of all civilizations. Reason and rationalism are what direct human action, while religion's role is limited to fulfilling individual's spirit and emotions. Wu (2007) pointed out that Hussein perceives Islam as a religion not a political system, and that Islam is concerned with the morality and spirituality of the individual, he also added that Islam does not prohibit Muslims from using reason in their worldly affairs. Galal (1993) added that Hussein calls for the separation between religion and politics, so that state's governmental structure is founded on utilitarian concerns not religious ones. And although spiritually important, religion should not interfere in directing political life nor the nation should be identified in religious terms (Hourani, 1962).

Taha Hussein's secular Framework was related to his nationalist thought. As Hussein demonstrated total rejection to Arab or Islamic nationalism instead, advocating for Egyptian patriotism (Galal,1993). Hatina (2014) added that his writings focused on the emphasize on the Egyptian "Pharaonic heritage" not the "Islamic heritage" (p.38). Ali (2017) added that to Hussein, the state is a "Secular phenomenon" which is established on Egyptian national consciousness not on Islamic consciousness (p.365).

Nevertheless, Taha Hussein advocacy of an Egyptian secular state is not based on the total withdrawal of religion but rather, religion had a significant role in building the nation. To him, religion's role is consolidating the "spiritual health of the nation" (Hourani, 1962, p. 333). In his book "ala Hamish al sira", Hussein revealed that religion is necessary to fulfill people's hearts and teach them some facts about the world and universe. Either Islam or Christianity, as to him, Islam do not oppose Christianity but rather complement it (Hourani, 1962). Even more, religion obtains its social value only when it strengthens nationalism (Wu, 2007).

Taha Hussein's moderate secularism was reflected on the educational system he advocated for. To him reforming the education was necessary, educational systems should be established to spread science and reason (Hourani, 1962). To Hussein, the state is the sovereign entity that has the

responsibility to manage, administer, and supervise the educational system for the goal of achievement unified national consciousness (Ali, 2017). Nevertheless, Hussein's educational system although focusing on the teaching of worldly sciences and civic virtues, advocated the teaching of religion. "In the future of culture in Egypt" Hussein argued that even in foreign schools, students should learn more about religion as part of their spiritual health and cultural heritage (Hatina, 2014). Even more, he did not reject the role of al-Azhar as a religious center that is a source of spirituality (Galal, 1993). However, he stressed on state supervision of Al-Azhar as a way of teaching Islam as the religion of science and knowledge, and moreover an instrument that spread Egyptian patriotism instead of the old Islamic nationalism (Hourani, 1962).

In this context, Although Taha Hussein is strongly Eurocentric, Hussein's thought reflected "partial secularism" (Ali, 2017). Hussein advocated the separation between religion and the state where religion should not interfere in world affairs and the political public sphere. However, his secular framework further implied that religion can be used as an instrument for achieving national consciousness in the sense that Islam is subordinate to national identity and that Islamic civilization is perceived as a cultural asset, that strengthen nationalism, rather than divine commands (Shepard, 1987).

This form of secularism differed considerably from the French secular form in certain respects: firstly, difference on the role of religion in relation to national identity, secondly, on permitting the public display of religion, and finally the difference on the position of religion in educational system.

'Laicite' French Secularism vs Taha Hussein's Secular Framework:

The Roman Catholic church had played a prominent role and practiced significant power in central Europe in general and in France in Particular (Kuru, 2008). With the French revolution 1789, an intellectual war had erupted between the French republicans and the church. Rivalry increased between republicanism and Catholicism (Kuru, 2008). In 1905 the republicans were able to counter the hegemony of the church and issued "the separation law" which guarantees the church independence from the state and freedom of religious belief with respect to public order (Calhoun, 2010). The separation law had set the legal base of laicite. Amiraux and Kousseurs (2013) stated that laicite is founded on two main principles. The first is the church-state separation, and the second is state being neutral towards religious differences. Colhoun (2010) added that article 1 in the 1956 constitution directly states that "France is a secular republic".

With secularism being rooted in the French revolution, it became an integral part of the French political system. Moreover, Calhoun (2010) stated that France perceive its secular system not only as a characteristic of its political system, but also an integral part of the French national consciousness, in which religion play no role. Amiraux (2013) argued that secularism is the main source of French nationalism and added that what started as a political principle evolved to be the foundation of national discourse. Chelini-pont and Ferchiche (2015) added that French citizens perceive laicite as a peaceful unified instrument where it escapes religious differences and instead encourage national identification. Calhoun (2010) pointed out that the long history of "anti-clericalism" is the base for citizens' attachment to secular identity. In fact, while Taha Hussein believed the religion could play a role in building national consciousness (state making use of religion), France perceive laicite itself as the source of national consciousness with no reference to religion.

With regards to permitting 'public display of religion', the French secular system had gone radically prohibiting any demonstration of religion in the public sphere. In this context, the law of banning Islamic veil is always cited (Jones, 2012). Hunter-Henin (2012) stated that two different laws show the radicalism laicite is demonstrating. The first law was the ban of Muslims Veil in public schools in 2004, and the second is the banning of 'Burqa' or 'niqab' in public places. Conservative secularists in defense of these laws argued that secularism ought to be protected and that public demonstration of religion is a threat to the old secular system (Jones, 2012). On the other hand, Dinner (2008) commented on these laws arguing that banning religious signs had revealed the false and dangerous application of secularism as this contradicts with the moderate secular principle of respecting all religious beliefs. Jones (2012) added that these laws are stemmed from the belief that Religion should have no influence in the public sphere. In fact, while Taha Hussein would not reject the public practice of religion, France Radical secularism banned any religious demonstration publicly.

With regards to the role of religion in the educational system, Kerchove (2013) stated the French School system was the first to be affected by the secularization process. Jules Ferry, minister of education, was the first to secularize public schools in late 19th century, replacing religious curriculums with republican and civic curriculums (Jones, 2012). Rajan (2004) added that the French educational system is based on the expulsion of religion and banning catholic schools. Kerchove (2013) added that public schools are prohibited from introducing religious teachings which are substituted by civic and moral teachings. Even more, educators are not allowed to introduce or define themselves on religious bases. In short, while France secular system banned all religious teachings in public schools, Taha Hussein believed religious teachings should not be prohibited but rather positioned under state supervision.

Conclusions:

In conclusion, there is no distinct form of secularism (Amiraux & Koussens, 2013). Secularism could vary from being moderate or partial till being radical or combative (Kuru, 2008). This study had reviewed different western and eastern contributions to secularism, focusing on Taha Hussein's secularism in the Egyptian context, and France 'laicite' in the western context. The paper argued that Taha Hussein's secularism differed from France's secularism. As while Taha Hussein encouraged the state's use of religion as a tool in creating national consciousness, laicite perceive religion as a divisionary tool. And While Hussein would not have rejected the public display of religion, France radical secularism rejected public religious demonstration. And while Hussein believe religion should have presence in education, France's educational system banned religious teachings. These differences had reflected a comparison between a moderate secular thought and a radical secular system. A disparity that could be attributed to the different historical contexts that shaped the nature of secularism within the two settings.

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The Evolution of the ‘Anonymous Movement’ and the International Community’s Response: A Constructivist Perspective

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Introduction:

The international community has experienced a change in the nature of armed conflicts by the rise of new phenomena, such as new wars, terrorism, counterinsurgency, and the internationalization of civil wars. This paper thus aims to observe the change that has taken place, by specifically focusing on the concept of new wars and analyzing it through a constructivist lens. The paper argues that constructivism has a powerful capability of explaining the evolution of new wars and the way through which the international community deals with it. To be more specific, the paper focuses on hacktivism as a type of new wars throughout its analysis. In order to further prove the argument, the paper utilizes the hacktivist group Anonymous as a case study.

Accordingly, the paper is divided into three sections. The first section defines the concepts of “hacktivism” and “new wars” through applying the characteristics of hacktivism to the properties of new wars. The purpose of this application is to prove that hacktivism qualifies as a type of new wars. The second section demonstrates the relevance of the ideas of constructivism to the evolution of Anonymous and its cyber attacks. Finally, the third section illustrates the relevance of the theory to the way through which the international community deals with the evolution of Anonymous. In that sense, the paper first highlights constructivism’s emphasis on the construction of international law and human rights as important international norms in the international system. Then, it shows that the international community responds to the attacks of Anonymous through these two factors, as a means of proving that the theory is capable of explaining the international community’s response to the evolution of Anonymous.

Hacktivism as a New War:

New wars emerged as a new concept in International Relations (IR) as a result of the changes that occurred in the nature of armed conflicts. While scholarly debates have been fostered on whether new wars are really new or not, scholar Kaldor (2013) has provided an insight into the change in the nature of armed conflicts by providing a comparison between old and new wars to prove that new wars are really new. There are several types of new wars in the field of IR, including hacktivism. Hacktivism is a merge between hacking and activism, in which cyberspace resources are utilized as a means for protesting or promoting a certain economic or political agenda (Sigholm, 2016, p. 14). Some scholars argue that it is a form of electronic civil disobedience that aims for social changes, while others argue that it is a destructive act that undermines the internet’s security, constituting an anarchic condition on the world stage (Krapp, 2005, p. 73-74).

According to Kaldor (2013, p. 2-3), new wars are new in terms of their actors, goals, methods, and means of finance, and based on these criteria, hacktivism is a new war. Firstly, while old wars were interstate wars that had states as the primary actors, new wars include non-state actors (Kaldor, 2013, p. 2). Similarly, hacktivism is practiced by non-state actors, involving either one person or many people, who form a loose organization that links between them (Krapp, 2005, p. 88). These actors are known as e-bandits, who take part of a transnational activism and take advantage of information technologies for making virtual attacks that can create political changes (Brown & Wong, 2013, p. 1015).

Although they always have identified targets, hacktivists do not reveal their identities and rather utilize anonymizing technologies for creating what is known as the “politics of no one” (Brown & Wong, 2013, p. 1015). This means that hacktivists operate their cyber attacks without revealing who they are to their targets, in order to invoke into them the feeling that the threat can come at anytime and from anyone (Brown & Wong, 2013, p. 1015). Even though it is difficult to determine the identities and goals of hacktivists separately, the act of hacktivism itself gives them a common identity and a common goal (Brown & Wong, 2013, p. 1022).

Secondly, the goals of old wars were either geopolitical or ideological, and had political mobilization as the instrument of war (Kaldor, 2013, p. 2). However, new wars take place under the name of identity, forming what is called the “identity politics”, which has political mobilization as its main aim rather than the instrument of war (Kaldor, 2013, p. 2). Similarly, hacktivism is practiced in the name of identity, in which hacktivists identify themselves as the promoters of morality and social justice (Bodford & Kwan, 2018, p. 73). Thus, hacktivists make cyber attacks to capture people’s attention regarding these principles, and to mobilize the people towards sharing the same views as theirs (Hampson, 2012, p. 515).

For instance, one of the hacktivists’ beliefs about social justice is the idea of empowering the disempowered, who in their opinion are the citizens (Brown & Wong, 2013, p. 1017). They in fact believe that governments hide information from their citizens by creating highly secured systems, and thus hacktivists attack these systems to facilitate the flow of information to the people (Brown & Wong, 2013, p. 1017). In that sense, the goal of hacktivism is to challenge the governments by altering people’s perceptions about them (Arquilla & Rondelft, 2001, p. 14), and to mobilize the people into holding the belief that the access of information is significant to their individual autonomies (McCarthy, 2015, p. 442). Not only that, but also hacktivists create cyber attacks to demonstrate their rejections towards certain governmental actions (Hampson, 2012, p. 538). Through these rejections, hacktivists send messages to the population in terms of signifying the governments’ wrongdoing, and thus mobilize the people against their own governments (Hampson, 2012, p. 538).

Thirdly, the old methods of war used to be capturing territories through military means; however, the new methods of wars are new technologies and having control over the population through political means (Kaldor, 2013, p.3). Likely, hacktivism involves the use of the internet and technologies for the achievement of the previously mentioned goals. Hacktivism is in fact a digital realm that is used to protest certain economic and political conditions, and its methods include virtual sit-ins, email bombs, computer viruses and worms, and denial distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks (Denning, 2001, p. 263).

Indeed, Nye argues that “technology is putting into the hands of deviant individuals and groups destructive powers that were once reserved primarily for government” (Brown & Wong, 2013, p. 1023). He in fact refers to the hacktivists’ decisive use of technology as the method of initiating wars on governments, and to their ability of taking away the governments’ power. Through this technological method of war, hacktivists transmit messages to the people to make them think in a way that is aligned with theirs as aforementioned, which results in shaping public opinion and having control over the people.

Fourthly, old wars were financed by the states themselves, but new wars are financed by diaspora support, humanitarian aid, and also by illegal ways, such as looting and pillaging, smuggling, and kidnapping (Kaldor, 2013, p. 3). Although hacking or cyber attacks do not need money to be operated and rather need technological skills and critical thinking, they still involve attacking financial systems to acquire money illegally, which can be considered as looting. In fact, the financial sector, including banks and other financial institutions, constitutes one of the major targets of hacktivists because the material gains attract them (Whitburn, 2018).

The Evolution of Anonymous from a Constructivist Lens:

Anonymous is a hacktivist group, consisting of a network of individuals that lacks structure, organization, and membership requirements (Martins, 2017, p. 96). It attacks targets in the cyberspace, mainly big governments and businesses, which hold different values or promote different interests than its own (Greenberg, 2012 as cited in Klein, 2015, p. 383). Its most common online tactics are DDoS, unauthorized account access, website defacements, and data exfiltration (Martins, 2017, p. 96), and it operates within the notion of anonymity through these tactics (Brown & Wong, 2013, p. 1017). It usually works with WikiLeaks, an international non-profitable organization that releases leaked material, in which Anonymous leaks information and provides it to WikiLeaks for publishing (Aftergood et al. 2011, p. 8).

Furthermore, constructivism is a theory that argues that actors give meaning to social subjects based on the way they perceive themselves (Das, 2009, p. 965). In other words, they perceive social

subjects according to how they identify themselves, and based on these perceptions, they start acting and making decision (Das, 2009, p. 965). The theory thus emphasizes on the importance of factors such as identity, ideas, and beliefs, which construct the behaviors of actors as well as their perceptions of the world around them (Das, 2009, p. 965). This is applicable to the case of Anonymous, which identifies itself as the promoter of justice that acts for a noble cause, which is the promotion of the citizen's rights and liberties (Greenberg, 2012 as cited in Klein, 2015, p. 383).

Anonymous' main goal is in fact to fight injustice and promote righteousness through empowering the disempowered, or taking from the rich and giving to the poor (Brown & Wong, 2013, p. 1021). By the rich, Anonymous means the government, and by the poor, it means the citizens, referring to the governments that hold so much power through hiding information from their people. Based on Anonymous' perception of itself, it starts giving meanings to the governments and their actions as well as to the citizens, and based on these meanings, it initiates its cyber attacks. In that sense, Anonymous is part of an information movement that initiates wars on governments as a result of perceived injustice, and for the purpose of equalizing the distribution of information (Gramsci, 1971 as cited in McCarthy, 2015, p. 444).

Constructivism also explains the evolution of Anonymous. Anonymous was initiated in an online message board, 4chan, as it started rising and gaining power between 2003 and 2008 (Klein, 2015, p. 383). 2008 was the year during which it had its power at its peak, for it increased in number and initiated several cyber attacks on world governments and institutions (Schneider, 2013 as cited in Klein, 2015, p. 383). This power was gained through Anonymous' convincing ability, in which it attracted a huge number of supporters and persuaded them of the worthiness of its cause, encouraging them to join the group (Martins, 2017, p. 96).

Based on its attempt of disseminating ideas and of using the soft power of persuading people with its beliefs, Anonymous successfully evolved from a small number of people just sharing beliefs on an online message board to a powerful hacktivist group that has the ability to fight world governments through its cyber attacks (Martins, 2017, p. 97). In addition, the attention drawn by the cyber attacks from the governments was also a contributor to Anonymous' success, which is manifested in its influence on public opinions and public policies (Martins, 2017, p. 97). For instance, Anonymous greatly helped in overthrowing the repressive regime of the Tunisian President Ben Ali in January 2011 through initiating DDoS attacks, web site defacements, and facilitating the flow of information in support of the rebels in and out of the state (Martins, 2017, p. 97). As a result of the increased rebellions with the help of Anonymous' online involvement, Ben Ali immediately dissolved his government and fled to Saudi Arabia (Martins, 2017, p. 97).

Another example that reveals the power of ideas and beliefs in Anonymous' actions is its attack on the Canadian governments' websites. The attack was a result of the Canadian legislation of the Bill C-51, which is an anti-terrorism Act that allows the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) to disrupt any perceived security threats (ABC News, 2015). Anonymous opposed the Act, and thus attacked the CSIS and blocked the government's internet access and servers (ABC News, 2015). Although the Canadian government perceived the Act as a security measure that would help the federal agencies in increasing surveillance and in facilitating the share of information, Anonymous perceived it as an unjust Act that was targeted at those who disagree with the government, limiting or even demolishing their freedom of expression (ABC News, 2015). Therefore, the hacktivist group initiated its cyber attacks on the Canadian government as a means of empowering the Canadian citizens.

The International Community's Response from a Constructivist Lens:

Not only does constructivism explain the evolution of Anonymous, but it also explains the way through which the international community deals with it. The international community believes that the actions of Anonymous are malicious and illegal based on its belief in the significance of international values for the international security. In other words, the international community counterattacks Anonymous through the value it gives to some international norms, which in this case are international law and human rights. Along with its explanation of the emphasis that ideas and beliefs have on the actions and perceptions of actors, constructivism argues that states construct international norms and abide by them as a means of maintaining stability (Das, 2009).

It can be inferred from the international community's response to Anonymous that due to its perception of the group as a threat to the international security, the international community has directed its focus towards delegitimizing the group's actions through international laws and human rights. This indeed means that security is seen as an attempt to construct the interpretation of the triggers of insecurity, and deal with them accordingly (Tajdbakhsh, 2007 as cited in Tsai, 2019, p. 22-23). In simpler words, because threat is subjective rather than objective, and actors decide to give it importance based on their own perception of its severity, the international community has constructed Anonymous as a threat to the international security, and thus decided to give it attention and direct its efforts towards combating it through significant international norms. Such ideas are in fact reflected in and explained by constructivism.

While hacktivists perceive cyber attacks as a means of demonstrating against unjust governments and of promoting social justice through empowering the disempowered with information, the international community criminalizes such actions, transforming the meaning that hacktivists give to themselves (Krapp, 2005, p. 73). Therefore, the international community has regarded many cases of cyber activities as cyber crimes and sometimes even as espionage (Blank, 2013, p. 409). The idea of having different views regarding hacktivism demonstrates the power of construction, which shows that actions take place based on perception, and it is an idea that only constructivism can explain.

States have aimed to fight cyber threats of various kinds through treaties such as the 2001 Budapest Convention on Cybercrime (Shackelford, 2009, p. 219 as cited in Green, 2016, p. 96) and through international laws such as the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber warfare (Finlay, 2018, p. 358). However, since non-state actors, like Anonymous, are not bound by international treaties, they are not subject to sanctions for violating them (Denning, 2001, p. 70). As a result, the international community has searched for alternatives to prevent threats from non-state cyber actors, Anonymous in this case, still through international law. For instance, states have established a customary law obliging themselves to prevent harm to other states through preventing their properties from being used for the purpose of harm (Buchan, 2016, p. 6).

In this case, states hold the responsibility of being vulnerable to non-state actors' exploitation of their technical tools that are used for pursuing cyber attacks; hence, states are obliged to equip themselves with the capabilities of detecting non-state actors in their territories and of preventing their use of the means of cyber attacks (Buchan, 2016, p. 11). However, the law did not specify the means through which states can achieve that, so international tribunals allow states to choose their own measures (Buchan, 2016, p. 12).

In fact, based on how each state views Anonymous and other non-state cyber actors as well as how much of a threat they impose on them, states make their decisions about how to prevent their threats. For instance, Sigholm (2016, p. 3) argues that well-developed states may see that the means to prevent hacktivism should be through the development of defensive capabilities that can protect digital measure like command and control systems. On the other hand, the developing states may perceive cyberspace operations like telecommunications networks as more attractive methods in terms of expenses and political risks (Sigholm, 2016, p.3). Some states may also believe in the private sectors' importance for the enhancement of cybersecurity against hacktivism, and thus decriminalize the self-help response options of the private sector (Ayers, 2016, p. 21). Based on the perception of the size of the threat, states create the measures to prevent them.

Although liberalism is an IR theory that can explain the states' response to hacktivism that has taken place through international laws, constructivism still provides a better explanation. Liberalism argues that states pursue cooperative measures for the purpose of containing threats, and international laws are forms of cooperation between states. In that sense, since states have resorted to the construction of international laws for fighting Anonymous, it could be argued that liberalism is more suitable for explaining the international community's response to Anonymous than constructivism is. However, the customary law developed in that case gives the power and the freedom to the states to decide upon the measures they believe are suitable for abiding by their obligations to the law of preventing harm. Thus, the factor of perception still plays an important role in the states' actions, which is an idea that is explained by constructivism rather than liberalism.

Another way through which states deal with Anonymous is by the significant international norm, human rights. Many of Anonymous' actions are regarded by the international community as violations to human rights, and therefore are illegal. This is evident in the case of the American Security Intelligence Company, Stratfor, in which Anonymous stole internal emails and provided it to WikiLeaks to reveal the information provided in them (Sorell, 2019, p. 400). The material included in the stolen diplomatic cables were a varied set of emails, some of which were private information, exposing employees to cyber hostility by both Anonymous and WikiLeaks (Sorell, 2019, p. 400).

In fact, regardless of the employee's personal information, WikiLeaks published the material, while article 12 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights guarantees people's right to privacy, including personal emails, especially when the publication of information harms innocent people's reputations (Sorell, 2019, p. 400). Moreover, both Amnesty International (2010 as cited in Sorell, 2019, p. 400) and Human Rights Watch (2010 as cited in Sorell, 2019, p. 400) have acknowledged the embarrassing disclosure of information that were not in the public's interest, and thus violated human rights. Therefore, Anonymous is dealt with by the international community through international law and human rights, which are two main international norms that states perceive as crucial for the world's stability, and this is the power of construction that only constructivism can explain.

Conclusions:

In conclusion, hacktivism is a form of new wars that imposes a technological threat in the cyberspace. Anonymous exemplifies that type of threat, and it even illustrates the means through which such threats are evolved and can be dealt with. Through a constructivist analysis, the paper has demonstrated that the evolution of Anonymous and the way through which the international community combats it is based on perceptions, identities, beliefs, and international norms. Nonetheless, the paper highly relied on constructivism throughout its analysis without comparing it with other theories, as a means of highlighting constructivism's power in explaining the case of Anonymous. In that sense, the paper could have referred to the limitations of the two main IR theories, realism and liberalism, in explaining the paper's case, since the focus of the papers falls under the realm of IR. Therefore, the paper recommends a future research to be conducted through a comparative approach between the three theories to better reveal the power of constructivism in explaining the paper's case.

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The European Union: Liberal on the Inside, Mercantilist on the Outside

Rola El-Kamash

Introduction:

The European Union (EU) is the largest trade bloc in the world. It offers its 27 member states a single market within which 19 member states use the Euro currency. The EU is an advocate of liberalism and appears to be the most liberal regional bloc due to its high level of integration (European Union, 2019e). However, a closer look at its external trade policy reveals that it has a protectionist/mercantilist side as well. Thus, the EU contains elements of both liberalism and mercantilism. This paper argues that the EU applies economic liberal policies of free trade among its member states internally, while it adopts mercantilist/protectionist policies vis-à-vis non-EU states externally. This paper is divided into 2 sections: The first section briefly discusses the liberal aspect of the European Union, stressing the positive roles of the single market and trade defense policies towards ensuring free and fair trade for EU member states. The second section critically examines the mercantilist side of the EU, explaining the EU's use of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) against non-EU countries in order to ban their imports. This paper only focuses on the EU's use of NTBs; however, it is not the only neo-mercantilist practice utilised by the EU.

1. The EU's Liberal Side

Economic Liberalism promotes universal free trade and calls for the removal of trade barriers to allow the free movement of goods and service across borders. It calls for minimal government intervention and mainly depends on competition and the self-regulation of the market (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2020a). The Liberal side of the EU is manifested in its single market, free and fair trade promotion and trade defense measures that all aim to benefit the EU member states.

1.1. The Single Market

The EU represents the highest level of regional integration whereby its member states agreed to remove all intra-EU barriers, established a customs union with a common external tariff, allowed the internal free movement of labor and capital, created a single market with homogenous economic policies, and even took it to the next level and established a political union. How is this beneficial to member states? The single market offers the EU member states the opportunity to engage in full economic cooperation characterized by free trade and removal of trade barriers (European Union, 2019e). Moreover, it offers the EU member states a positive-sum game where the European companies can benefit from the comparative advantage of all EU member states (European Commission, 2016a). Furthermore, the EU is more attractive to investors because it offers a larger market, which offers investors more opportunities than a single state would (European Commission, 2016b). Thus, the European Union offers its member states a win-win situation.

1.2. Trade Defense Measures

The EU also applied trade defense measures in order to secure free and fair trade. These measures are put in place in order to ensure the economic protection and prosperity of EU member states. Trade Defense measures include: (1) Anti-dumping measures – dumping occurs when imports are sold at a lower price than their true value. Under Regulation (EU) 2016/1036, the EU reserves the right to impose anti-dumping duties on imports that threaten the market stability. However, there are conditions that must be met before imposing duties: the EU must conduct a fair comparison between the import price and its original value, prove that the dumped products negatively impact the market and that the anti-dumping duties will not harm the European community's interests. According to the EU, the most offending country in terms of dumping is China. Thus, in 2016, the EU imposed anti-dumping duties on more than 50 Chinese imports in order to protect the European market. (2) Anti-subsidy measures – the EU also applies anti-subsidy duties on subsidized imports in order to offset the

negative effect they ought to have on the European Market and to ensure fair competition. (3) Safeguards – the EU also applies safeguards, which are short-term measures to regulate imports applied when imports of a certain product suddenly and sharply hit the European market taking the European producers by shock and not giving them time to adjust to the new trade situation. Thus, in such situations, the EU imposes safeguards in order to protect its producers in a certain sector from a certain product that suddenly floods the market. This was recently the case in 2018 when Trump imposed import restrictions on the American Steel Sector, which made exporters of steel divert their exports from the United States to the EU, flooding its market with steel and threatening the European steel sector. The EU responded by imposing safeguards to protect its steel sector and succeeded in saving 216,000 jobs (European Commission, 2019b; European Union, 2019a; European Union, 2019b; European Union, 2019c; European Union, 2019d; European Union, 2019f).

2. The EU's Mercantilist Side

Mercantilism (also known as Economic Nationalism) promotes the governments' regulation of the market and prioritizes personal economic gains at the expense of other countries' losses (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2020b). The Mercantilist side of the EU is manifested in its usage of non-tariff barriers. Non-tariff barriers to international trade include health and safety regulations, government procurement restrictions, subsidies, intellectual property restrictions, pre-shipment inspections and environmental standards (Millington & Bayliss, 1991; Pinder, 2001, 61; Institute for government, 2019). Non-tariff barriers are neither transparent nor uniform and, thus, they are harder to detect and eliminate (Neal, 2007, 128). This section explores how the EU uses non-tariff barriers in its external trade policy in order to promote its local production vis-à-vis non-EU imports.

2.1. Health and Safety Regulations

Among the most significant non-tariff barriers are the Health and Safety Regulations. They are based on certain criteria that exporting countries must abide by in order for the EU to import their products. Health and safety Requirements include: specific hygiene rules, specific limits and maximum levels of contaminant substances, clear food labeling (e.g. indicating if there are allergens, indicating the product's place of origin...etc.), abiding by regulations regarding the use and labeling of food improvement agents (e.g. indicating if the product contains food flavors, enzymes or additives), abiding by regulations regarding animal and plant health, and complying with legislation on animal feed (Institute for Government, 2019). From a surface view, these Health and Safety Regulations seem to serve the good cause of protecting the health and ensuring the safety of EU citizens. However, a closer look reveals that they constitute mercantilist and protectionist elements that aim to block non-EU imports and hinder the market access of non-EU countries.

There is an ongoing debate over whether Health and Safety Regulations play the role of a catalyst that invites developing countries to improve the quality of their products or that of an impediment in the face of non-EU countries by setting the bar too high. The latter claim is more realistic for the following reasons: Firstly, in order to comply with the health and safety regulations set by the EU, non-EU countries are required to have organizational resources and capabilities that many, especially developing countries, cannot afford (Breitbarth et al., 2009). Secondly, developing countries have to endure extra costs in order to ensure the products' compliance with the health and safety regulations, which makes the products more expensive and, thus, less competitive. For instance, Africa's competitive advantage of agricultural resource abundance and low labor wages will be offset and lost by spending money on complying with the health and safety regulations. As illustrated in Figure 1, the EU border rejected 1,509 African food and feed exports between 2012 and 2018. The countries who most violated the EU's health and safety regulations were Egypt with 342, Nigeria with 223 and Morocco with 185 cases of border rejections (RASFF, 2019). Thirdly, non-compliance is not an option for the exporting countries as their imports will be declined entry into the EU market (Kareem et al., 2018). According to the EU's Rapid Alert for Food and Feed database, the EU has border-rejected 9,993 imports for Health and Safety Regulations between 2012 and 2018 (RASFF, 2019). So, the EU's health and safety regulations must be abided by if non-EU countries want to access the EU market.

2.2. Environmental Standards

Environmental standards required by the EU for non-EU imports also constitute non-tariff barriers. It may seem like the EU is advancing the noble cause of protecting the environment and ensuring that trade does not damage it. The EU is actually considered a champion of environmental protectionism and this is portrayed in Figure 2, which shows that the EU was the highest notifying country in 2018 of environment-related trade issues to the World Trade Organization (WTO) with 84 notifications. However, the EU only started addressing environmental issues and leading environmental protectionism in the early 1970's after The Paris European Summit in 1972. Yet, the fact that the EU has experienced the Industrial Revolution some 200 years ago in the 1760's means that it had all the time needed to boost its economy and manufacturing capabilities at the expense of the environment. Thus, the EU among other developed countries have polluted the atmosphere and contaminated the waters and soils of the earth they are now trying to protect for so long. On the other hand, developing countries were exploited by the developed countries in the past and did not have the chance to industrialize and advance. Thus, by imposing harsh environmental standards on their exports today, the EU harms them by limiting their market access and taking away their competitive advantage (Sorin & Pilasluck, 2015; WTO Environmental Database, 2019).

One example of how environmental standards can negatively affect developing countries and act as non-tariff barriers is symbolized in the African biofuel exports to the EU. Ever since the EU established the Renewable Energy Directive (RED) in 2009, which sets specific criteria for Biofuel extraction sources, it has achieved its goal of protecting its local biofuel producers from foreign competition by using the imposed criteria as non-tariff barriers to block non-EU imports. This took place under the umbrella of environmental protection and reduction of fossil fuel contribution to global warming. Accordingly, the EU advocated the following criteria: that biofuels should not be extracted from forests that are undisturbed by human activity, legally protected natural areas or highly biodiverse lands (Erixon, 2012). Non-compliance with such criteria will result in the refusal of the biofuel exported to the EU as the biofuels will then not comply with the EU's national targets and renewable energy obligations (Shuenemann & Kerr, 2019). Thus, non-compliance is, again, not an option. Even if compliance comes at the expense of African countries' competitive advantage. Nonetheless, the EU argues that the RED is fair and ensures non-discrimination because the standards required from importers are also required from domestic biofuel producers (Erixon, 2012; Sorin & Pilasluck, 2015). However, as discussed earlier, the EU only adopted environmental protection measures after it reached a strong position, which African countries did not reach until today.

2.3. Public Procurement

Another non-tariff barrier used by the EU is public procurement. Although the EU is a signatory of the WTO's Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) and follows Directive 2014/25/EU on procurement for entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors, there is still discrimination against non-EU bids. For instance, some EU member states do not choose bids with less than 50% EU content. Other EU member states, like Austria and Portugal, show a bias towards European firms when awarding contracts regardless of technical efficiency and offered price. The United States has accused the EU of showing bias towards favoring Czech bids even when they were less competitive than those offered by the United States (Lignelli, 2008, 44-47).

Other EU countries decide to restrict cross-border/international public procurement in certain sectors. For instance, in 2005, the United Kingdom declared that it would only establish contracts with selected countries for public procurement in the defense sector. Thus, it chose AgustaWestland, an Anglo-Italian company, to purchase helicopters (Lignelli, 2008, 48). The EU also allows its member states to demand exemptions from following public procurement rules in certain sectors. For instance, Poland requested and was granted exemption from applying public procurement rules in postal services in 2016. As was the case for Hungary in 2014 and Austria in 2017 (European Commission, 2019a). In addition, the EU during the Global Financial Crisis in 2008 established stimulus packages in order to revive the economy, which were conditioned on public procurement from European firms. Thus, no matter how liberal the European Union seems to be, it has a protectionist and mercantilist side when it comes to benefiting its member states vis-à-vis non-EU countries. This is further portrayed in the fact

that, in 2016, the percentage of tenders with only one bid was 30%, which reflects the difficulty that non-EU companies face when accessing the procurement market in the EU (European Commission, 2017).

2.4. Agricultural Sector Subsidization

The European Agricultural sector is of great importance to the EU for the following reasons: Firstly, it is a price-sensitive sector that directly affects the European farmers and consumers. Thus, if crop prices suddenly and sharply fall, the European farmers will get hurt and if the crop prices suddenly and sharply rise, the European consumers will get hurt. Thus, it is important for the EU to ensure price fairness and stability in order to guarantee consumer satisfaction and to ensure a good standard of living for farmers. Secondly, farmers represent a significant electoral block and matter to member states' governments. For instance, in 2008, farmers made up 17% of the votes in France. Thirdly, agricultural crops are more than just commodities; they represent the identity, culture and effort of European Farmers (Watts, 2008).

Therefore, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was established to protect the agricultural sector and its beneficiaries (Neal, 2007). It is a significant policy that has evolved and been reformed over time, aiming at improving the European Agricultural Sector's competitiveness and promoting Rural Development. The EU pays crucial attention to the Agricultural sector and this is reflected in its allocation of approximately 40% of its total budget for achieving the CAP's goals (McElDowney, 2019; Verwoerd, 2019). This budget is used to fulfil direct and indirect subsidization under the CAP framework in the following areas: direct payments, market measures and rural development; As shown in Figure 3, direct payments constituted the largest percentage of CAP expenditure in 2018 with 70.9%, which constitutes € 41,496,516; followed by rural development with 24.5%, which constitutes € 14,346,900. Moreover, Figure 4 shows the CAP expenditure by EU member states in 2018, highest of which was France with € 9,467,117 spent on the Agricultural Sector under the CAP framework (European Commission, 2019c). Thus, the EU and its member states, though some more than others, subsidize the agricultural sector, which then constitutes a non-tariff barrier to non-EU agricultural imports as they will be much more expensive than the subsidized European ones.

Conclusions:

The European Union includes aspects of both liberalism and mercantilism. The former is reflected in its internal trade policy that promotes free and fair trade, and ensures protection of the EU's market through the single market and trade defense measures (anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and safeguard measures). The latter is reflected in the EU's use of non-tariff barriers in order to block non-EU imports. Four types of non-tariff barriers were examined: Firstly, the health and safety regulations that the EU imposes on food and feeds products from non-EU countries. It was shown that, between 2012 and 2018, the EU border rejected a total of 9,993 food and feed products because they did not comply with its health and safety regulations. This illustrated how health and safety regulations can act as non-tariff barriers to non-EU imports. Secondly, environmental standards required by the EU also constitute non-tariff barriers and this was reflected in the criteria set by the EU for African bio-fuels, which led African exporters to lose their competitive advantage as they had to spend more money to comply with the environmental standards. Thirdly, public procurement also constitutes a non-tariff barrier in the face of non-EU companies because many EU countries exempt certain sectors from following the GPA, some EU countries grant awards with only 1 bid, and other EU countries show EU-bias when awarding contracts. Lastly, under the framework of the CAP, the EU subsidizes the European Agricultural sector in 3 ways: providing direct payments, which has proven to be the most funded area in 2018, funding rural development and applying market measures. This makes the European agricultural products better priced and more competitive than non-EU ones that are not subsidized and have to comply with costly health and safety regulations. Thus, this paper has focused on examining the other side of the EU, the mercantilist side, stressing the protectionist policies used in order to block non-EU imports.

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
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
Appendix

Figure 1: EU Rejection of African Food and Feed Exports (2012-2018).




Source: Constructed by data from RASFF 2019.

Figure 2: Environment-Related Notifications by Highest Notifiers (2018).




Source: Constructed by data from WTO Environmental Database 2019.

Figure 3: Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Expenditure (2018).



Source: Constructed by data from the European Commission 2019c.

Figure 4: Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Expenditure in Euros (2018).



Source: Constructed by data from the European Commission 2019c.

Reviewing the Impact of Public Opinion on Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Strengths and Limitations

Sarah Hisham Salah Ali

Introduction:

Understanding the relationship between public opinion and foreign policymaking has been subject to various scholarly interpretations and analysis (Powlick & Katz, 1998). This complex relationship continued to attract scholarly attention specially after World War I and the efforts that followed to create a new international order which directed much attention to the impact of public opinion on foreign policy affairs (Holsti, 1992; Foyle, 1997). The influence of which elites and mass media have on the public, be it their main source of information and a tool in which their opinions are formulated has been portrayed by some scholars to be a top-down approach (i.e. from the government to the public). Nevertheless, this does not mean that Presidents and policy makers are granted *carte blanche* but rather constrained by popular attention of the public in their foreign policy choices.

The elite-centric model is a one school of thought which demonstrates the public's ambivalence about foreign policy issues; claiming that they are ill-informed, and are highly subject to fluctuation (Lippmann, 1995; Almond, 1960; Converse, 1964; Mearsheimer, 1990 as cited in Knecht and Weatherford, 2006). Thus, realists justify their assumption upon these traits in which authorities are to solely base their foreign policy on national interest regardless of the preferences the mass public hold (Kennan, 1951; Morgenthau, 1978 as cited in Knecht and Weatherford, 2006). Thus, the purpose of this paper is to assess the impact of public opinion on foreign policy decision making.

Even though this topic has been tackled through a variety of theoretical approaches, for instance, neo-classical realists incorporates external and internal variables in which certain insights are drawn from classical realism but in a more updated and systematizing manner (Rose, 1998). Further, neo-classical realists argue that state's foreign policy is first and foremost driven by its status in the international system as well as its relative material power capabilities (Rose, 1998). Even though they demonstrate that such capabilities have indirect and complex impact on state's foreign policy because of systematic pressures, it is still of higher importance and influence than public opinion (Rose, 1998).

In addition, constructivism provides a different avenue for scholars to understand the aforementioned complex relationship between leaders, public opinion, and foreign policy through highlighting the importance of non-material factors such as identity in defining state's national interest (Katzenstein, 1996; Geer, 2004). Further, constructivists argue that those interests are socially constructed in which international policies are the product of the interactive process among society's members (Finnemore, 1996; Hopf, 1998; Geer, 2004). Thus, in contrast to realists and liberalists whose main focus on the logic of consequences, constructivists rather seek to explore how this logic of appropriateness conditions state's behaviour (Finnemore, 1996; Geer, 2004). Accordingly, a president's broad outline of what can be done in foreign policy is influenced not only by poll responses, but rather by the aforementioned interactive process where first and foremost lies in defining state interest and identity (Geer, 2004).

Hence, arguing from a constructivism perspective, public opinion - be it publications, polls, or conducts- does exist as a social fact not a mere material fact as argued by previous ontological and epistemological scholars (Adler, 1997; Campbell 1992; Hansen 2006; Althaus 2004; Strong, 2015). More specifically, the extent to which it exists is dependent on the degree society and elites within a society think it exists. However, public opinion does not directly influence foreign policy, but it rather affects the degree of which policymaker consider it important (Foyle, 1997; Strong, 2015). Meaning that decision-makers construct their own images and opinions of what the public opinion or as stated in the literature "climate of opinion" might be, and consequently, formulate their decisions accordingly (Noella-Neumann, 1979; Blair, 2010; Strong, 2015). Thus, they formulate their own image of what constructs public opinion in light of exchanges with other actors as journalists, academics, pressure

groups or even ordinary citizens (Cohen, 1973; Herbst, 1992; Powlick, 1995; Entman, 2004; Strong, 2015).

However, given that this paper is exploring a growing and vast body of literature, the paper narrows down its focus of analysis to three contending theories realists, liberals and contextualists only. This relationship have always been a point of contention between liberals and realists (Holsti, 1992; Foyle, 1997); where the realist scope of analysis argue that public opinion rarely have an influence on foreign policy (Holsti, 1992; Foyle, 1997). On the other hand, liberals claim that public opinion affects foreign policy formulation, arguing that it is not only stable and structured, but has a greater influence than realist view allow (Foyle, 1997). Lastly, contextualism, a body of literature that constituted a complex relationship between the impact of public opinion on foreign policy where certain intervening variables are crucial to determine and measure to what extent does public opinion affect decision-making process; some of the intervening variables that were present in the literature were mass media and opinion leaders (Holsti, 1992).

The Realist Perspective:

Realism tends to be reviewed as a pessimistic approach which claims the state to be a black box, neglecting domestic factors and focusing more on the international aspect and power gaining. This approach is further divided into traditionalist and neo-realists; where the first trend focuses on state behaviour and power maintenance in the international community (Rose, 1998) while neo-realists focus more on the impact of international politics on state behaviour (Holsti, 1992; Foyle, 1997; Burchill, 2005; McCraw, 2008). Hence, it could be concluded that both approaches view foreign policy as an independent outcome of states behaviour, aside from domestic factors – as aforementioned. Thus, extensive research have been conducted during the first two decades after World War II which yielded a broad agreement of the two most prominent realist thinkers – Almond and Lippmann- (Holsti, 1992). This ‘Almond-Lippmann consensus’ was based on three main assumptions: (1) is that public opinion is volatile and provides inadequate foundations of foreign policy (Holsti, 1992); (2) public opinion lacks coherence and structure, thus, lastly (3) it has a little – if any- impact on foreign policy (Holsti, 1992).

Accordingly, Realist thinker Hans Morgenthau (1978) argued that public opinion is considered a barrier to coherent diplomacy (Morgenthau, 1978; Holsti, 1992); it also hinders efforts to promote national interests (Morgenthau, 1978; Holsti, 1992). Thus, public might be informed enough to deal with local issues that affect their daily lives, but foreign policy affairs are too advanced for their experience (Holsti, 1992). Moreover, Morgenthau (1978) summarised the case against the impact of public opinion on foreign policy by stating that rational and good foreign policy cannot rely on public opinion support – with their emotional preferences (Morgenthau, 1978; Holsti, 1992).

Philip Converse (1964) stated that based on a previous analysis made from the 1950s to the early 1960s, political beliefs of mass public lacked structure and coherence (Converse, 1964; Holsti, 1992); comparing mass responsiveness across several domestic and foreign policy issues, he found that masses tend to be more informed on domestic issues rather than foreign policy related concerns. Jacobs and Shapiro (1994) suggested a disconnection between public opinion and decision-making which was clear while Lyndon Johnson attempted to direct public opinion on Vietnam, he failed in stimulating changes in the public’s position (Jacobs & Sharipo, 1994; Foyle, 1997). In this case, neither policymakers were able to shift public opinion, nor the public were able to influence decision-makers (Jacobs & Sharipo, 1994; Foyle, 1997); which indicates the lack of connection between public opinion and policymakers when it comes to foreign policy decision-making.

Pitkin (1967) cited Lippmann’s (1995) argument where he claimed that while people could elect and remove the government, they themselves cannot govern (Foyle, 1997). In addition, former diplomat George Kennan (1951) claimed that public opinion is a poor basis for decision-making; thus, Kennan suggested moving against the tide of public opinion (Kennan, 1951; Foyle, 1997).

This approach could be seen in President Truman’s speech where he stated that “some people think that public relations should be based on polls. That is nonsense. I wonder how far Moses would have gone if he had taken a poll in Egypt?” (Hechler, 1982; Foyle, 1997).

Another example found in the literature was the Howard government in Australia where its foreign policy goals were mainly relying on military maximization and enhancement (McCraw, 2008)

which is why it has been viewed from a realist perspective – as in addition to its military focus, the government’s strategy was to maintain global security as well (McCraw, 2008). Thus, neither public opinion nor mass media had the power to impact its foreign policy but rather the government’s own value (Foyle, 1997; McCraw, 2008). This was also clear in the actions taken by the Australian government towards Zimbabwe and Fiji which required imposing various levels of ‘smart sanctions’ as travel banning and sanctioning their aid programmes (McCraw, 2008; Hanks, 2011).

The Liberal Perspective:

According to liberalism, states seek international cooperation; thus, they view state institutions as a mediating force towards cooperation and peace (Walt, 1998; Islam, 2009; Heiss & Johnson, 2018). As cited in Heiss & Johnson (2018), those institutions could be domestic – as public opinion or media – or international (Heiss & Johnson, 2018). Although other previous research has claimed that public opinion had no impact on foreign policy due to its incoherence (Almond, 1960; Tomz & Weeks, 2013); this liberalist view claims public opinion to have a crucial role as for plenty of reasons (Tomz & Weeks, 2013).

First, it is rational, stable and coherent unlike what the realist approach have claimed; it has a considerable impact on foreign policy decision-making and in addition, it could influence foreign policy in three ways – *Agenda setting* as the attitudes developed by the general American public post 9/11 and the rise of ‘war on terror’ and the aftermath of Arab framing in the media and terrorists, *parameter setting* and *Implementation*. Second, leaders who disapprove their constituents’ risk being removed from office (Tomz & Weeks, 2013). Third, leaders face institutional constraints on their ability to use force (Morgan & Campbell, 1991; Tomz & Weeks, 2013); where the public opinion affects how tightly those constraints bind (Tomz & Weeks, 2013). Lastly, leaders are aware that giving attention to public opinion increases their chance to gain popularity; thus, they have vast opportunity to accomplish more during their office (Tomz & Weeks, 2013).

Leaders are aware that citizens care about foreign policy which often plays a role in electoral campaigns and that foreign policy mistakes can affect leaders negatively at the ballot box (Aldrich, Sullivan & Borgida, 1989; Gronke, Koche & Wilson, 2003; Gelpi, Reifler & Feaver, 2007; Tomz & Weeks, 2013). As stated before, leaders are aware of the importance of public opinion in gaining popularity (Tomz & Weeks, 2013); in the United States for instance, popular presidents have more influence over Congress (Edwards, 1997; Krosnick & Kinder, 1990; Howell & Pevehouse, 2007; Tomz & Weeks, 2013). Not only that but they use more international influence, because those who enjoy public support finds it easier to persuade other countries, giving their promises and threats more credibility (Tomz & Weeks, 2013). In addition, it has been claimed that in decisions regarding the use of force, leaders tend to pay close attention to public opinion, what would they say and how would they react (Baum, 2004; Baum & Potter, 2008; Berinsky, 2009; Cannes-Wrone, 2006; Foyle, 1999; Holsti, 2004; Mueller, 1973; Reiter & Stam, 2002; Rosenau, 1961; Russett, 1990; Sobel, 2001; Tomz & Weeks, 2013).

Thus, it is clear that policymakers formulate their choices with an eye to ‘covert’ public opinions, that exile expectations about public reactions to foreign policy decisions shape the decisions they take (Powlick & Katz, 1998; Zaller, 1994); and that leaders are sensitive to public opinion regarding the use of force (Foyle, 1999; Sobel, 2001; Baum & Groeling, 2010). Therefore, the literature suggests that any effort at deep disarmament is unlikely going to be sustainable without domestic and political public support (Bell & Queck, 2015); and even those who seek to oppose nuclear disarmament should therefore understand and pay attention to the conditions under which mass public support or oppose an issue – disarmament- (Bell & Queck, 2015).

By examining Reagan administration decisions regarding the Lebanon intervention in the 1980s, it could be concluded that public opinion had a role in influencing Secretary of Defence Weinberger (Powlick, 1988; Foyle, 1997); thus, public opinion did act as a factor that contributed in the decision to evacuate the marines from Beirut (Foyle, 1997).

The Contextualist Perspective:

This body presents a more complex relationship in defining the impact of public opinion on foreign policy. As Carlsnaes et al (2013) argued, contextualism is based upon the constructivist theory which emphasizes the importance of ideas, norms and national interests in constructing one's perspective of the world (Carlsnaes, Risse & Limmons, 2013). There are some intervening variable – as mass media and opinion leaders – that positively influence foreign policy decision-making (Arnold, 2011).

A. Media

Since media can affect public opinion, which in return, affects the decision-making process in foreign policy (Hulme, 2001); this section aims at exploring the extent of media's impact on foreign policy (Coban, 2016). Robnsson (2001) defined media as a twenty-four-hour coverage tool that can affect foreign policy agenda and directly influence decision-making process (Blair & Holbrooke, 1999 as cited in Robinson, 2001). Livingston (1997) classified media into three main functions: a catalyst in the decision-making process or an impediment to a certain policy and lastly, an agent of analysis to agenda-setting process which might influence policy formulation (Livingston, 1997). Thus, it could be concluded that media has a dialectic role where at one hand, it supervises government's actions with consciousness and criticism or act as a government's guardian on other times (Livingston, 1996).

In addition, referring to the case of Japan post-independence, it had major plans to be achieved, one of which was the Grand Strategy (Shinoda, 2007). Additionally, it has been argued by Japanese politicians that media and press aided them in formulating public opinion through disseminating information about governmental policies, which could later develop into a political wave with a little bit more influence of the media (Shinoda, 2007); such power is derived from the credibility and impartiality of mass media and its role as an intervening variable to influence foreign policy decision-making (Shinoda, 2007).

Moreover, it could also be stated that media had an impact on the US-Vietnam intervention where America lost its public support mainly through the influence of media (Hulme, 2001). Lastly, Naom Chomsky and Herman (1998) developed a book called 'Manufacturing Consent' where they argued that there is a positive relationship between both variable – media and decision-making process – (Herman & Chomsky, 1998); where this relationship is directly connected between policy-makers and media (Herman & Chomsky, 1998). This could be applied in the case of the US-Iraq invasion where media has disseminated the 'pro-invasion' ideology to the public under the slogan of 'Operation: Iraq Freedom' to win public's support and legitimizes their intentions of invasion (Kull, Lewis & Ramsay, 2003).

B. Opinion Leaders

Lastly, this section of the literature tends to briefly assess the role of opinion leaders as other intervening factor that shapes the relationship between media and foreign policy decision-making process from a contextualist approach. Opinion leaders could be defined as community leaders or ministers who directly convey a certain message to those within the general public whom they are able to influence (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1995; Nincic, 1992). Several studies have compared the views of opinion leaders and general public (Luttbeg, 1968; Wittkopt, 1992). Much of the results indicated persistent gap between both where at times, opinion leaders tended to support the US active role in world affairs by total of (97%) whereas the public counted as less enthusiastic by a total of (59%) (Holsti, 1992). Lastly, almost three fourth of leaders agreed that cold war has ended back then, but about a third of the general public expressed that view in comparison to opinion leaders (Holsti, 1992). Finally, at the peak of the Cold war in the late 1940s for instance the more educated 'strata' of US society followed the less educated in their expanding hostility towards the Soviet Union (Nincic, 1992).

Conclusions:

As per the viewed sample of the literature the paper can conclude that, it was clear enough in providing enough theoretical information with clear division, methodology and – sometimes – argument; however, eight major gaps have been found. First, the literature is Euro-centric and tackles

all possible analysis from a Western – centric perspectives, claiming that the results of the history of Western countries – mainly United States- is a one size fits all and can be applied as an interpretation to other small or non-Western countries. Second, the literature did not provide enough and thorough information regarding contextualism and its relation to foreign policy, the literature mainly provided narrow examples of opinion leaders which most importantly, lack a solid definition of the term. In addition, the literature did not explore the impact of other intervening variables as the nature of foreign policy or the role of policymakers.

Third, the literature was found to be mainly utilising case studies that are transcended from the cold war period, not giving much analysis to other recent incidents that are taking place such as the impact of media on the on-going Brexit crisis or Catalonia’s call for independence. Thus, for that reason, the literature tend to be out-dated. Fourth, the literature tended to present both realists and liberalist approaches as opponents, mainly equating realism with pessimism and liberalist with more optimistic view of world politics. However, this is not always the case, as it does not necessarily have to be realists versus liberalist but it should have been presented in a more neutral and analytical manner, highlighting some areas of interests between both approaches in regards to the impact of media and the decision making process.

Fifth, the literature lacked clarity of the elite’s perception on defining what exactly represents and counts as ‘public opinion’ to them, does it include interest groups? Mass media and oppositional groups? Is it part of civil society? For this the literature was left vague with no specific answers other than the definition provided above. Sixth, the literature also lacked cross-national comparative study, where either one incident is analysed from different theoretical approaches or highlighting a common concern and observing the media’s impact on it across different nations to present a full and comprehensive understanding of the relationship between public opinion and decision-making in foreign policy. Seventh, there was no variety of authors’ backgrounds, which was noticed after analysing the sample of the articles used, it was clear that most scholars were Western scholars as well with little to minimal contributions of non-western scholars in this field of analysis. Lastly, neither the relationship between public opinion, political regime and decision-making process nor the relationship between the elite’s usage and exploitation of media to direct the public were obvious enough in terms of who exactly directs whom and why?

Despite the aforementioned gaps, the literature has comprehensively provided various theoretical approaches and perspectives of analysis and in some cases, it provided models of application in the subdivisions, attempting to provide a full grasp of the topic. Also, it has been noticed that the literature mainly focused up on the state-level of analysis, where it directed much of the attention to the domestic factors that might contribute in shaping governmental policies. Lastly, it has been concluded that realism deny any impact between public opinion and foreign policy decision making; claiming that the public are uninterested, volatile and there is no direct relationship between it and decision-making. Thus, they treat the state as a ‘black-box’ and direct much of their attention to power in the international system. On the other hand, liberalism claimed that public opinion is crucial in foreign policy decision making process, arguing that public is not always the source of evil but in fact, leaders need them to gain popularity and legitimacy. Also, liberalist tend to argue that a policy is proved to be more successful if it is backed up by public support, not only that but liberalist highlight the public’s role in elections where public could greatly impact their results if they decided to contribute and vote, neglect and ignore or lastly, revolt and demand removal. Lastly, contextualists presented a more complex body of the literature where it claimed that the relationship between media and decision-making is a contextual one, meaning that it depends on other intervening variables in order to be determined. The paper discussed media and opinion leaders as two of the intervening variables to briefly understand the topic from a contextualists approach.

Lastly, the paper suggests further research to be conducted upon the impact of public opinion in the MENA region, more specifically, the impact of mass media and foreign policy, especially with the rise of such an influential media platform as social media which gave access to free information and opinion sharing not only to the public, but to the leaders and policy-makers as well. Also, the paper suggests directing more attention to the political culture of the public opinion, as an attempt to develop

a line of thought by classifying the public opinions into different political cultures – parochial or active-which is believed to aid the study of the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy.

To further comprehend the complex relationship between public opinion and foreign policy the paper suggests assessing the impact of other domestic variables such as geography, population, size of the territory or military power on the foreign policy of the state. Second, integrating the impact of multilateral agreements on public opinion, and how it affects foreign policy outcomes as a result. Finally, assessing the relationship between regime types, public opinion, and foreign policy to further aim the scholarly debate in regard to the degree of influence of public opinion in democratic and non-democratic countries.

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Part II
International Interventions

“Failed States” and the Colonial Powers in Sub-Saharan Africa: Colonial Heritage and International Intervention in Nigeria

Feras El-Shawarby

Introduction:

Sub-Saharan African states have been facing different types of problems since their independence; political violence, civil wars, civil unrest, and terrorist groups. Therefore, the international community gave importance to the situation in Sub-Saharan African states, due to its effect on international peace. (Brooks, 2005). Thus, the international community started to identify some African states as “failed-states”² or “Fragile-States”³. Failing to reach a concrete definition of a “Failed-State” and, most importantly, not giving a clear explanation of the tools of assessing the failure of states, nor the reasons and causes of their failure. Many attempts have been made by scholars and institutions such as the Fragile States Index (FSI), Crisis States workshop, Brooks, and many more to reach a definition for state-failure, without success. With this the definition of state-failure arrived with complicity, hence the purpose of this paper is to address these complexities, mainly focusing on the causes of state-failure and the exploitation of the concept.

Defining state failure is imperative in highlighting the failure of the government and its institutions in different ways, either due to internal or external factors. No matter the definition adopted of state-failure, it is believed that developed countries are obliged to assist failed states, to correct the outcomes of colonization. (Call, 2008). This paper argues that ‘State Failure’ is the result of the colonization of the western powers to Sub-Saharan African States, and that the concept of ‘State Failure’ is exploited by western powers; to achieve personal gains such as the acquisition of resources or power, which negatively affected states in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The paper explores the causes of the results of the FSI’s classifications from the year 2008 till 2018 to Nigeria, and the effects of US intervention in the country since it took place. The paper is divided into four parts. The first part will be a literature review on the misinterpretations of the concept of ‘failed-states’. The second part will be the conceptual framework defining the concepts used. The third part will examine the role of ‘tribalism’⁴ in Africa’s state-building post-colonialism, this part is used to examine the effects of the exploitation to the term state-failure by foreign parties on state-building. The fourth part will be divided into two sub-parts in support to the argument through the case study of Nigeria and its classification as a ‘Failed-State’ by the Fragile States Index and the United States Commission on National Security.

Literature Review:

Scholars have approached state-failure from different perspectives such as the legal and social fields in the state, in regard to the governments’ performance in these fields on the internal and external levels of the state (Di John, 2011 & Call, 2008). “Most commentators define failed states in opposition to the successful states⁵ that are presumed to be the norm” (Brooks, 2005, p. 1160) Brooks stated that there is a problem with the definition of failed states, because states identified as failed states are put in comparison to other states identified as the developed states. Brooks (2005) highlighted that states cannot follow the same route, as there are differences between states. However, Brooks (2005) believed

² “A state that can no longer perform its basic security, and development functions and that has no effective control over its territory and borders”. (Crisis States Workshop, 2006) The term ‘State Failure’ and ‘Failed States’ will be used interchangeably in the context of this paper.

³ “It is a state that is particularly vulnerable to internal and external shocks and domestic and international conflicts”. (Crisis States Workshop, 2006)

⁴ “is the state of being organized and advocating for a tribe” (Okogu, 2016, p.93).

⁵ “Successful states control defined territories and populations, conduct diplomatic relations with other states, monopolize legitimate violence within their territories, and succeed in providing adequate social goods to their populations.” (Brooks, 2005, P. 1160)

that the main common ground between states in the international community is international law, whereby states have the same legal rights and obligations. Therefore, he highlighted that failed states are the ones that cannot interact in the international community with other states, or institutions through treaties and agreements on different levels.

On the other hand, Di John (2011) focused on the internal performance of the government in the state, as he gave attention to the ability of the government to maintain security and social services. Moreover, Di John (2011) examined several indicators to 'failed states', and reached two main conclusions; first, that the concept of 'failed state' is a flawed concept that defies the essence of state-building, as he mentioned that state-building is an open-ended process, as observed from history, state-building evolves in accordance to its era. Thus, establishing an indicator of failure, makes state building a closed-ended process that has its limits. Second, Di John (2011) concluded that the study of one sector in a state is not enough to be considered as an indicator of its failure. He rather emphasized the importance of studying several sectors of the state and highlighted that the most important feature of a 'failed state' is the presence of a struggle of power between the regime and an armed group (Di John, 2011, p. 2-4).

In "The Fallacy of the Failed State" Call (2008) mentioned that different definitions of 'state failure' are misinterpreted, as he believes that the concept of 'failed states' has six misinterpretations; First, he stated that the concept disregards the cultural differences between the identified failed states. Second, "The cookie-cutter prescription" in which the international community draws one solution for all the states disregarding the different causes of their weakening. Third, the international intervention in 'failed states' increases the military funding of armed groups fueling armed conflicts. Fourth, the concept itself is routed from Western norms, making it based only on the experience of Western states. Fifth, the belief that the process of building a state leads to peace, that it is just an assumption, and that state building could lead to more conflicts rather than peace. Sixth, he believes that the concept is being exploited by Western countries to avoid accountability from their policies during colonialism. (Call, 2008).

This entitles that the concept of state failure is misinterpreted by the international community, as all the scholars mentioned above, highlighted flaws in the concept and the exploitation of the concept by dominant states. The misinterpretations and the exploitation of the concept of state failure, makes the concept a problematic term that is misused and misunderstood, and has a negative impact on states who are considered weak states in the international order.

Conceptual Framework:

A. State Failure/Failed States;

As identified by the Crisis States Workshop⁶ (2006) a 'failed state' is basically a state that is enduring an internal or external conflict affecting its functions in the social, political, and economic sectors; in the social sector affecting its ability to secure good health services, educational services, and facing inequality. In the political sector a state that is facing a struggle of power on different levels; externally or internally, Armed or not, and routed from different causes. In the economic sector, a state that has an unequal system of sources distribution or low rates of living and growth rates. The Crisis States Workshop (2006) continued its definition identifying the 'Failed State' as the opposite of a 'Stable State' where its institutions are capable of fighting different types of crises.

B. Divide and Rule strategy;

The Divide and Rule Strategy was the strategy used by the colonial powers in Africa to maintain their control over their colonies. It targeted the African population to create conflicts and gaps between them, in order to maintain a stronghold of their lands and resources. This happened through, integrating some of the tribes' chiefs in the administration of the colonizers and assigning individuals as leaders on certain places to collect taxes and maintain stability of the population. Locals who held different

⁶ The Crisis States Workshop is a workshop done in the Crisis States Research Network under the London School of Economics and Political Science. It was organized to "undertake interdisciplinary research into processes of war, state collapse, and reconstruction in fragile states. (The Crisis States Network)

positions in the colonizing administration were granted money and power, which created a struggle of power between the tribes. Some tribes were marginalized from the chain of power, which led to further conflicts between tribes, and some of these conflicts were fueled by the colonizers. The divide and rule strategy aimed to destabilize the relationship between tribes and create a rivalry, leading to 'ethnic rivalry' in Africa. (Ali, M. & Fjeldstadz, O. & Jiangx, B. & Shifaz, A. 2015).

Tribalism in Post-Colonial Africa:

As stated by Okogu & Umudjere (2016) tribalism is the feeling of belonging to a group with certain norms and values, these norms and values differ from one group to another. Moreover, Okogu & Umudjere (2016) emphasizes that 'tribalism' is a negative concept, he does not refer to the tribalistic nature of Africa. He rather connects the negativity of the concept to the term itself and its misuse by the international community, as the widespread believe is that tribalism and ethnic diversity is the main obstacle for states' building in Africa.

According to Michalopoulos & Papaioannou (2011) and Wig (2016) there is a significant relationship between historical political structures and present state-building in Africa. Moreover, Bayeh (2015) argued that the contemporary problem with Africa is the diminishing of traditional institutions that existed pre-colonialism, and their replacement with foreign administrations (Bayeh, 2015). This emphasizes the importance of the traditional structure of African societies 'tribalism' in addressing the current situation in Africa, as foreign structures of states will no address the main concerns of the society.

On one hand, Michalopoulos & Papaioannou (2011) examine states' development in linkage with local ethnicities, highlighting the importance of historical ethnic institutions to a state's development. They emphasize on the importance of institutional equality to reach economic development. Furthermore, they highlight that the problem in Africa that hinders the achievement of economic development is; the allocation of national borders without taking into consideration the tribal divisions of the African society. Which led to the inclusion of some tribes under institutions oriented to different cultures, creating unequal institutions, i.e. having one tribe torn between two states.

On the other hand, Wig (2016) took a different approach to the importance of tribalism in Africa, as he underlined the essential role of centralized traditional institutions. Wig (2016) argues that groups with centralized traditional institutions tend to be more peaceful than other groups, as he reached the conclusion that groups with traditional institutions have a higher chance of reaching common ground with the government than groups without traditional institutions (Wig, 2016, p.512). It could be understood from the above that, tribalism and ethnicity are important in addressing the main problem in Africa, which is the existence of several failed states. However, according to Okogu & Umudjere (2016) the current tribalism in Africa is negative tribalism, where African leaders discriminate against other tribes due to their desire of acquiring more wealth, deterring the process of state-building.

Thus, Michalopoulos & Papaioannou (2011) and Wig (2016)'s understanding of the role of tribalism in Africa cannot be achieved. Applying Ali et al. (2015)'s assumptions on the effects of the 'divide and rule strategy' on Africa which are; first, creating an ethnic rivalry between tribes with historical basis, and second, forming a ruling system that upholds the state's power to one group, and the allocation of the national borders between African ethnicities as shown in Figure 2. It could be reached that colonialism has a direct effect of hindering the process of state-building in Sub-Saharan Africa, through establishing negative tribalism, thus, fueling the failure of African States such as in the Nigerian case.

Nigeria:

Nigeria before the British colonization consisted of several societies that had a historical record of cooperation through mainly trading, these societies lived in integration for years before the colonizing era. (Kinnan, C. & Gordon, D. & DeLong, M. & Jaquish, D. & MaAllum, R. 2011). After the colonization of what is identified now as Nigeria and after the application of the 'Divide and Rule' strategy mentioned above, the negative traits of 'Tribalism' started appearing. Conflicts erupted between ethnic tribes within the borders of Nigeria, and in different areas of the country. These conflicts were mainly civil wars that began in 1967 with the Biafran Civil War, political violence, electoral

violence, and the rise of terrorism with the terrorist group Boko Haram. (Kinnan et al. 2011, Ikyase & Egberi, 2015, and Agiboba, 2016). Nevertheless, Nigeria is considered to have a relatively good economy in the region, as Nigerian score on the 2019 Economic Freedom Index⁷ is 57.3, making it the 14th on the region and the 111th on the world with economic freedom.⁸ Although, the World Bank Group identifies Nigeria as the largest Oil exporter in Africa, it is stated that Nigeria has several obstacles due to corruption, internal conflicts, and the dependency on Oil market, that negatively affects its economy and status as a working state. This explains the score of Nigeria in the Fragile States Index⁹ since 2005 until 2018, and as mentioned by Kinnan et al. (2011) Nigeria is recognized by the ‘United States Commission on National Security’ as a ‘failed state’ due to the threat it opposes to its neighbors and international actors. However, these institutions do not study the relation between the policies applied by the colonizers and the conflicts happening in Nigeria. Thus, their solutions do not address the root causes of the problem in Nigeria.

Examining State failure in Nigeria in light of the Colonial legacies:

The Fragile States Index will be used to examine Nigeria’s ‘state failure’ with colonial legacies. Nevertheless, the index was criticized by many such as Beehner, L., & Young, J. (2012, July 17). However, the purpose of this paper is not to examine the credibility of the definitions of state failure, but rather the complicity that came with those definitions. The FSI States Index is an important tool in the analysis of this paper, as it contradicts itself. The index’s reports and indicators highlight the negative effects of colonization and foreign intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The FSI is a report done through four main indicators and 12 sub-indicators, that are measured on a scale of 10, and the higher a state scores, the higher its risk of failure is and the closer it is to being identified as a ‘failed state’ on the spectrum. Nigeria scored between 95 and 102 between 2005 and 2018. Therefore, it has been recognized as a ‘high-risk’ fragile state since 2005 till 2018. This part will analyze each of the four main indicators with respect to their relation to the colonial heritage, and to investigate the possibility of a relation between colonialism and the failure of African states.

The first indicator of the States Index Fragile report is the ‘*Cohesion Indicator*’ that includes security apparatus, factionalized elites, and group grievance. This indicator mainly focuses on armed conflicts within the state, the integration of the individuals within the society and the institutions of the government (The Fragile States Index). As mentioned by Thomsan (n.d) Nigeria includes more than 250 ethnic and sub-ethnic tribes. Nevertheless, due to the ‘divide and rule strategy’ which aimed to diminish the social cohesion in Nigeria (Ali et al., 2015), power was divided between only three ethnic tribes (Russel, 1998) which generated a permanent struggle of power. Adding to this struggle of power, the international community ought to build a state in Nigeria to establish peace. However, as Call (2008) assumed, it did not lead to peace, it rather increased the conflict by increasing the weapons market. Thus, it could be noticed that due to the strategies of the colonizing powers as mentioned by Kinnan et al. (2011) and the policies of action towards ‘failed states’ by the international community, Nigeria scored a high ratio in the ‘*Cohesion indicator*’.

The second indicator is the ‘*economic indicator*’ that includes uneven economic development, economic decline, and human flight and brain dead. This indicator focuses on the progression in the economy throughout calculating different aspects in it. This indicator analyzes the distribution of the economy, and finally monitors the migration ratios of the population. (The Fragile States Index). As mentioned previously in the ‘Divide and Rule’ strategy the colonizers depended on allocating local individuals as leaders for their own gains, and included them in the payroll of taxes with high ratios. Furthermore, Kinnan et al. (2011) highlighted that discrimination was accepted and emphasized by the

⁷ “The Economic Freedom Index is poised to help readers track over two decades of the advancement in economic freedom, prosperity, and opportunity and promote these ideas (2019 Index of Economic Freedom)

⁸ In economically free societies, governments allow labor, capital, and goods to move freely, and refrain from coercion and constraint of liberty beyond the extent necessary to protect and maintain liberty itself. (2019 Index of Economic Freedom)

⁹ The Fragile States Index is a tool that assess the fragility of states and failure of states to make a “political risk assessment and early warning of conflict accessible to policy-makers and the public at large” (Fragile States Index)

colonizers, and was embedded in the structure of their colonies in Africa. Thus, the colonizers were the first to introduce unequal distribution of wealth in Nigeria, making it a socially constructed act in the Nigerian society. Moreover, Nigeria is “an oil-rich country” (Kinnan et al., 2011) so it is supposed to have a strong economy. However, due to the colonizers, the resources of Nigeria were exploited and distributed between the elites who allied with the colonizers. Finally, due to the policies of the international community that generates exploitation, the locals of Nigeria are directly affected and, in some cases, forced to immigrate. This also means that the reason Nigeria scored high on the ‘*economic indicator*’ is due to as stated by Kinnan et al. (2011) the legacy left by the colonizers and the intervention Nigeria faces.

The *third indicator* is the ‘*political indicator*’ which includes state legitimacy, public services, and human rights and rule of law. This indicator analyzes the relationship between the state and the individuals in the state through the representation of the people in the government, the basic functions that the government should provide to its people, the fundamental use of laws, and the use of the state’s power. Since Nigeria gained its independence in 1960 it has been facing several military coups and civil wars (Russel, 1998). The reasons for these conflicts could be summed to the use of state power against the people and the marginalization of parts of the society, which is rooted to the colonial legacy created by the ‘divide and rule’ strategy, which granted the use of force to the elites assigned by the colonizers, this became a trait to hold power and fueled the struggle of power within Nigeria. Moreover, as Gordon (1997, p.934) highlighted, the colonial system recognized and embedded differences between the races in the institutions of the state, racial discrimination was legalized in the colonial system. The stated above led to the marginalization of groups which are not politically represented, because prior to independence the colonizers divided the power between three main tribes. (Russel, 1998). This means that Nigeria scored high at the ‘*political indicator*’ due to the legacy of the use of state force and the struggle of power left by the colonizers (Kinnan et al. 2011).

The *fourth indicator* is the ‘*social and cross-cutting indicator*’ that includes; demographic pressures, refugees and Internally Displaced People, and external intervention. This indicator calculates the pressure the state is facing due to; the access of the population to life-related aspects, the spread of life-threatening diseases, migrants and IDPs, and the influence of external actors. (The Fragile States Index). It can be drawn that Nigeria’s failure in the fourth indicator is the result of the armed and social conflicts happening in it. Moreover, these conflicts are the outcome of the policies of the colonizers, as they generated; a struggle of power and justified the use of state force against the people. Moreover, as mentioned by Call (2008) identifying a state as a ‘failed state’ increases the external intervention in states, which is one of the assessment criteria in the fourth indicator. Meaning that the policies fighting the phenomenon of ‘State Failure’ increases the fragility of the states.

The manipulation and politicization of “State Failure” in Nigeria.

The US Commission identifies Nigeria as a ‘Failed State’ due to the threat it opposes on its neighbors and to legalize its intervention. Therefore, the US has been intervening in Nigeria since 1966 with military forces and in Nigerian politics. (Emenyeonu, 1997). Nevertheless, Nigeria’s recognition as a ‘failed state’ by the US did not change, and the American intervention in Nigeria increased. The US military intervention in Nigeria mainly focuses on training Nigerian military forces and sending financial aid to the Nigerian army, because the Nigerian army is considered in the region as one of the biggest. Making a large-scale deployment of US military boots not needed, the US policy rather focuses on controlling the Nigerian military. As mentioned by Kinnan et al. (2011) the US increased its military intervention in Nigeria since 2005 by deploying naval forces and cooperating with the British forces, to train the Nigerian navy and assisting them in securing the Gulf of Guinea. This came after the international demand for energy increased, and the US declared the importance of oil production in the Gulf of Guinea, increasing the strategical importance of Nigeria to the US.

The US declared purposes of intervention were to stabilize Nigeria seeking international peace and security and to fight terrorism in the region. However, it can be noticed from Kinnan et al. (2011), Ikyase & Egberi (2015) and Agiboba (2016) that the US failed to achieve any sort of stability in Nigeria, as they just kept increasing the presence and role in Nigeria, Political violence increased, and Boko

Haram's influence in Nigeria increased. Moreover, Kinnan et al. (2011) mentioned that the US focused on deploying naval forces, which helped in securing the 'oil-market' in Nigeria.

Seeing the failure of the US in stabilizing Nigeria and their success in only increasing their presence and securing the 'oil-market', it can be noticed that the America intervention was to exploit Nigeria and secure the US's interest which is oil. This emphasizes on Call's (2008) assumption in regards to the use of the concept of state failure by western powers to intervene in states, and that the actions taken towards failed states increases the fragility of the state. Although the US has been intervening in Nigeria since 1966, Nigeria's ratio as a 'Failed State' kept increasing. The US intervention in Nigeria facilitated and increased armed conflicts rather than achieving peace.

Conclusions:

In final analysis, the definitions and indicators of 'state failure' by western states do not address the roots of the problem in Sub-Saharan Africa, which is in the inherited colonial structure of the states. As it could be seen in the case of Nigeria as a 'failed state' by the Fragile States Index and the US Commission of National Security.

State failure is the result of the colonization of the Western powers to Sub-Saharan African states, and that the concept of 'state failure' is exploited by Western powers. This was noticed throughout the analysis of the paper in examining the effects of the colonial legacy on tribalism in Africa post-colonialism, in the analysis of the indicators of the Fragile States Index and the colonial heritage, and in the exploitation of the concept 'state failure' in the intervention of the US in Nigeria. The current understanding of 'state failure' in Africa is foiled and needs to be developed, as it does not address the root causes of the failure of African states, it rather suggests policies and strategies that negatively affect the status of African states. As it was found that; the concept of state failure was exploited by the US to intervene in Nigeria and some of the FSI indicators are caused by foreign intervention. Further on, it can be argued that 'State-Failure' exists in Sub-Saharan African states, due to the colonial legacy, which is the corrupted political system of states, hindering governments from effectively establishing nation states in Africa. Which was noticed in the impact of the colonial era on tribalism, which created a negative tribalism, and from the exploration of the indicators of the FSI, it was seen that there is a link between some of the indicators and colonial heritage.

The recommendations of this study are to develop the study of state-failure to include the effects of colonialism on 'state failure' and the importance of Tribalism in nation building, as the first foundations of addressing a problem, lies within correctly identifying it. Moreover, it could be concluded from this research, that the study of the relationship between state building and conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa is important, to enhance the understanding of the existence of conflicts in the region; whether state building in Sub-Saharan Africa is the motivator of contemporary conflicts, or does contemporary conflicts hinder the process of state building in the region.

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Syria as a Battleground for Russian Interests

Mariam Ahmed

Introduction:

Throughout the centuries there have been always wars between states; whether it is hidden or revealed. Wars happen, because sometimes state's interest's clashes or medium-size states are not satisfied with the contemporary superpower. States use their foreign policy to achieve their interests. Yet, the external environment has a significant impact on their foreign policy decisions. This paper will examine Russian foreign policy towards Syrian crisis using system level of analysis. This paper argues that Russia is trying to re-emerge as a great power by supporting the regime of Bashar Al-Assad as it try to challenge the dominant power of international system (United States) and protect Russian national interest in Syria. This paper will be divided into three sections. The first section will be a brief background on Syrian crisis in 2011. The second section will be the theoretical framework using the power transition theory in the system level analysis. Third section will examine how the structure of international system impacted Russian foreign policy behavior toward Syria by focusing on Russia interests in Syria, Libya as an external factor of Russia behavior in Syria, Russian national security, Ukraine crisis 2014 and U.S and NATO intervention.

Syrian crisis in 2011:

21st century witnessed a wave of uprisings 'Arab spring'. The spread of the Arab spring across the Middle East was a result of poor economic conditions, repressive regimes, poverty and the increasing levels of un-employment. It started in Tunisia as a democratic uprising and its influence was spread to other Middle Eastern countries; one of those countries was Syria. The first spark was when a group of children in Dera' began writing slogans calling for the overthrow of the regime on the school walls. Yet, they were arrested and exposed to torture in Damascus and the family's request of their children to be released has been ignored. Subsequently, demonstrations were organized calling for the children release and the end of Bashar Al-Assad authoritarian rule (Baltes, 2016, p49-50). However, it was faced with security forces killing four individuals. This put the outset for attacking government offices and buildings. Moreover, it was escalated into a sectarian battle and became a civil war (Wimmen,2016). Following the civil war eruption, Syria witnessed the intervention of multiple players fighting for their interest in the region and competing for influence.

Theoretical framework:

The theoretical approach helps to further understand Russian foreign policy in Syria. The paper will have a special focus on the power transition theory which is part of neo-realism which is a system maintainer theory. Neo-realism focus on the structure of system and that the change in the structure of system are interrelated with the change of the distribution of capabilities across the actors in the system (Jackson & Sørensen ,2013,p75). States in the system are differentiated not by their functions but by their power as it shapes the state behavior. According to neo-realism the structure of the system in which states exist in is anarchy; no world government and they act as self-help (Jackson&Sørensen ,2013,p75).

While, the power transition theory emphasized that the nature of international system is hierarchal. On the top of the hierarchy comes the hegemonic state which is today the 'United States' that has two functions; to set the rules and distribute international benefits, who gets what, allocate different benefits to different actors. Then, comes under the hegemonic state, the great powers they are powerful states but their power cannot match the power of the dominant state. At the bottom are the middle and small powers (Lemke,1997, p3). This order of power is crucial to maintain order and stability within the system by the hegemonic power. So long as the dominant power distributes benefits in a fair manner the great powers will be satisfied with the distribution of power and will not challenge the dominant power. However, if the great powers are dis-satisfied a conflict could occur in the international system. Yet, they should have also the power to actually challenge the dominant power as

if the dis-satisfied states are weak they cannot challenge the dominant power as Russia and china could be a potential challengers(Lemke,1997,p3-4)(Kugler&Organski,n.d,p2-3).

Great powers (Russia) move from supporter to challenger when the dominant state (United States) is being an unfair in the distribution of the benefits, try to challenge United States hegemonic position in the international system. There are certain actions that triggered Russia dis-satisfaction from the United States. First, United States conducting ambitious expansion in the Middle East that was perceived by Russia as threatening to its national interests in the region, the expansion of the NATO in eastern Europe as a direct penetration in Russia sphere of influence; Ukraine crisis and last but not least the intervention of the NATO in Libya. At the end, all these reasons led Russia to act the way it acted in Syria as Syria presents for Russia a sphere of influence. Therefore, all these reasons will be examined in the coming sections.

The level of analysis that will be relevant to use under the framework of power transition theory is the 'system level of analyses'. The system level of analysis is the interactions between states and the international system because change in the international system will reflect on the state behavior(Newmann,n.d). System level of analysis help to understand how it influence the division of power, interactions between states and how structure of international system influence foreign policy behavior. The international factors that the paper will be focusing on are: power relations factors; power relationship between Russia and other regional forces, to take certain foreign policy in reaction to foreign policy of other actors in international system and the structural factors; structure of power in the Middle East. Both this external factors fit into power transition theory as it acknowledges the power in the international system as being distributed on material basis (Jacobs,2015).

Russia intervention in Syria:

Russia ties with Syria go back to 1970s, when it gained influence in Syria by aiding them with arms. Nevertheless, after 1990s the influence has been reduced (Talukdar,2016). However, Russia support increases again with the Arab uprising. Russia on 30 September 2015 intervened military by conducting air strikes in Syria. These strikes constituted Russia biggest and first intervention in the Middle East since 1989 (USSR collapse) (Stent,2016). This intervention aimed at supporting Al-Assad regime and to counter-terrorism not only because of Russia's interest in Syria and in the region but also to counter United States support of a regime change by securing her role in the Syrian political process(Princeton,2018).Moreover, after the over throw of Gadhafi in Libya, Syria is the only Arab country that have friendly relations with Russia that have not been broken since 1970s(Trein,n.d.p3). Furthermore, Russia intervened in Syria at the request of the Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad as the state authority was still recognized as legitimate by the United Nations. Unlike, United States using humanitarian intervention as a justification for interfering in other's countries internal affairs; only Russia possess a legal mandate to intervene (Plaskoudas, 2016). Thus, with these developments the Syrian civil war transformed into proxy U.S-Russia conflict.

Russia interests in Syria:

Russia defending Syria means defending its own assets and access to the region as the Arab spring weaken its influence in the region. Russia interests in Syria are mainly concerned with those two cities which are; Tartus and Latakia which have strategic importance for Russia (Dyer&Hille,2015). As long as it maintains its presence in Tartus and Khmeimim air base it have a foothold in western Asia(Talukdar,2016,p3). For Tartus, it is the only Russian military naval base that allows the access of ships into the Mediterranean outside the former Soviet Union territories. Moreover, Syria provides Russia the opportunity to its military to have permanent presence in the region and to gain an entry point to the region (Borshevskaya,2017). Additionally, the Syrian government agreed to make the base as a station to Moscow's nuclear-armed ships and submarines. Meanwhile, in Khmeimim, Latakia Russian largest listening stations and its main signals intelligence base in Syria and is used for aviation purpose (Talukdar,2016).

Apart from the strategic concerns, Russia has involved economically in Syria. Russia's economy mainly based on the extraction of natural resources and it is highly dependent on the prices of gas and oil as they are accounted half the revenues of federal government (Princeton,2018). From 2006

to 2010 Russia exported around 48 percent of its arms to Syria. It also invested in other sectors such as energy, steel, infrastructure and aviation. In the energy sector in 2013 Syrian signed a contract with Russian company called 'Soyuzneftegaz'; the contract is valid until 2038. The agreement was that this company will have the right for the exploration and drillings for oil and gas from Tartus to city of Banyas and include 45 miles into the Mediterranean. Syria fulfills Russia's ambitions to be a key player in the world. Syria's geographic location is the most important factor to Russia as it could work as a network of oil and gas pipelines to Europe (Talukdar,2016,p4,5).

Consequently, it threatens Russia's dominance over the export of gas to Europe as its share from total Europe gas imports more than 50 percent(Talukdar,2016).As a result , Russia pressured Al-Assad as it does not want competitors in the energy sector to be capable of monopolizing the market. By supporting Al-Assad regime to stay in power, Russia guaranteed the presence of its forces in Syria bases. That could help Russia to be an obstacle for Qatari development of its own gas pipelines through Syrian territory on to the European market through Greece. Moscow wants to position itself to be the connection point of other new offshore gas discoveries in Eastern Mediterranean (Talukdar,2016). Russia used arm sales and energy deals to have an access to the Middle East as it will serve Russia's objective to maintain and grow economic partnerships.

Another problem could arise with the overthrow of Al-Assad regime that Russia fears. His overthrow will lead to the emergence of Islamist regime to replace him and could export terror to Chechnya and north Caucasus. Also, it might be the motive behind regime change and spread of democracy across Caucasus and central Asia (Talukdar,2016) (Princeton, 2018). Furthermore, Russia will make sure that whoever replaces Al-Assad will be a friend that is willing to host Russia naval and air presence on Syrian ground (Trenin,n.d,p3). Russia president Vladimir Putin said that "there is a need to take the initiative and fight an destroy the terrorists and militants in the territories that they have captured rather than waiting for them to arrive to our soil"(Charap, Treyger & Geist, 2019).However, according to the U.S state of department claim that 90% of Russia airstrikes was directed toward Syrian rebels backed by the U.S and some Gulf Arab states and took place where ISIS had little or no presence ,not targeting ISIS or Al-Qaeda affiliated groups(Allcock,2016). Subsequently, Lavrov clarified that the "air campaigns aimed at targeting all terrorists in Syria, not just ISIS" (Russia joins war in Syria: Five key points,2015).

Also, the goal of Putin was to leave the west with only two options either to choose ISIS or Al-Assad regime. Because in the Kremlin view, Assad's defeat would have had disastrous consequences on regional stability(Borshevskaya,2017).Additionally, Russia was anxious about the effects of the conflict on the large Muslim population in Russia as some went to Syria and join anti-Assad forces, they do not want the Muslim Russian's rebel fighters to come back into Russia to maintain its national security(Jones,2017). Moscow emphasized that the restoring of Syrian statehood was the only viable long-term counter-terrorism strategy. As Putin said that "we do not want there to be a situation similar to Libya, Somalia or Afghanistan, in Syria. He also stated that" as soon as Syrian statehood was destroyed, the vacuum will be filled by terrorists"(Charap,Treyger&Geist,2019).Also, according to Putin Western backed regime change has been the source of in-stability in the international system(Charap,Treyger&Geist,2019).

Russia used Syria for showing off its newest weaponry and training opportunities for Russian troops (Borshevskaya,2017).Russian attempt to return to the global stage by making the Middle East its key testing ground(Trenin,n.d.p1).

Libya as an external factor of Russian behavior in Syria:

Russia had also interest in Libya before the overthrow of Gadhafi regime in October, 2011. Russia saw the overthrow of Gadhafi as a direct undermining of its interests in the region. As a result, Russia lost Benghazi port which provide a naval base for Russian's permanent presence on North African coast(GadafyoffersRussiaanavalbaseinLibya,2008).Furthermore, Russia lost investments worth about \$ 4 billion in Libya. Because of the United Nations sanctions, Russia lost arms contracts .In 2008, Russia company 'RZHD' signed an agreement to build a Sirte-Benghazi high-speed railway along the Mediterranean was postponed which costed Russia \$ 2.2 million(Fasanotti,2016)(Talukdar,2016).. In addition to, the intervention of the North Atlantic trade

organization (NATO) with United States backing in Libya should have been limited to protect the civilians.

However, the result of this intervention was a regime change; the overthrow of Gadhafi. Thus, Russia criticized the United Nation resolution of military intervention in Libya and saw that NATO intervention breached a lot of International and humanitarian law as NATO airstrikes caused a lot of civilian casualties(Farge,2012). As a result, Russia lost a lot of investments in Libya and would do anything to not repeat the same scenario in Syria.

In 2015 ,speech at the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly, Putin pointed to the examples of Libya, Iraq, Yemen, and Afghanistan, asserting that “destroying government institutions there, created power vacuums that were immediately filled by terrorists.” Putin concludes that without Russian support for al-Assad, the situation in Syria would look like that in post-Gaddafi Libya(Cohen,2019).

Russia national security:

After what happened in Libya, Russia insisted to take a stance in Syria and to support Al-Assad regime and to protect its national interest in the region. Russia wanted to be treated in the international system as an equal to the west, particularly United States. Russia wants to be globally recognized for its significant role in solving challenges as international terrorism that have a negative impact on the region (Talukdar,2016). Russia intervention in Syria was to prevent Al-Assad regime from falling in the hands of IS(Talukdar,2016). Russia wanted to be involved in every international decision concerning the Middle East. Russia achieve this by creating transactional relationship by increasing cooperation, arms and energy sales(Borshevskaya,2017,p1).To traditional United States allies such as Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, KSA and UAE visited Moscow to sign agreements for arm purchase(Stent,2016).

In theory Russia is there to fight ISIS. Yet, in reality it is there to attack the opponents of Al-Assad regime which are backed by the west(Jones,2017). As a result of the uprising, ISIS seized the chance of the Syrian government busy fighting the protestors and took over Eastern Syria city of ‘Raqqa’(Syrian civil war: Five ways the conflict has changed the world,2016). Thus, there was a contradiction strategy in defeating ISIS between United States ‘Obama administration’ and Russia. United States believes that in order to defeat ISIS Al-Assad overthrow is necessary. While, Russia believes that IS should be defeated first then can be talks about political transition(Dyer&Hille,2015). Russia is competing with United States for regional leadership. It seized the Syrian crisis to bolster its ties with United States allies in the region undermining United States influence in the process as United States did in Libya(Princeton,2018).

Russian appeared in Syria as a regional power in a way that make them fill the vacuum as United States did not do anything for a long period of time regarding the issue of Syria. It is a reminder for United States when it does not take the initiative, others will(Dyer&Hille,2015).Russia try to promote multi-polar system rather than uni-polar, it does not try to be the only power. Thus, it want to undermine United Sates influence in the region by presenting an alternative influential external actors like itself.(Princeton,2018)(Stent,2016).

Ukraine crisis in 2014:

Many Russians considered Ukraine that at once it was part of Russia’s province. About 20 percent from the Ukrainian population are Russians and they are concentrated in Crimea in the south and Donbas in the east(Welt,2017,p8). Before the collapse of the former Soviet Union eastern Ukraine hosted heavy industrial sector that is related to defense manufacture. As a result, even Ukraine independence it have strong economic ties with Russia(Welt,2017,p8). Ukraine is crucial to Russia for multiple reasons: Russia have a naval base in Crimea, Russia depend on Ukraine for gas transit to Europe as it builds pipelines that bypass Ukraine such as ‘Nordstream’ gas pipeline that is connects Germany directly to Russia. Moreover, If Russia’s fleet left from the region, it could open the opportunity to bring Ukraine into NATO which Russia would oppose(Welt,2017,p9,13,14). Russia has seized Crimea and intervened in eastern Ukraine in response to NATO expansion.

In the beginning of 2014, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich decided to postpone an agreement that could establish closer economic and political relations with the European Union as

Russia pressured in terms of trade barriers that what Ukraine would lose if preferred The European Union over it (Trenin,2014,p12). Thus, after a month Yanukovich accepted a financial assistance from Russia. Consequently, his decision led to a mass protest in central Kiev 'Euromaidan protest' because the protestors suffered from poverty and corruption and they looked at the EU as a solution and a way out. Thus, Yanukovich was removed from power (Trenin,2014,p12). Moreover, Russia annexation of Crimea with a referendum (that was by some as illegal) on secession and declared that the region is under the Russia Federation which presents a geopolitical shock to European security (Welt,2017,p9).

United States and NATO intervention:

With regards the Syrian case, President Obama viewed U.S policy towards Syria as a necessary response to al-Assad's use of chemical weapons against his own people and the expansion of ISIS. While, Putin viewed U.S policy as part of a geopolitically-motivated strategy to dominate the Middle East at the expense of destabilizing the region and violating the international norm of sovereignty (Cohen,2019).

Also, statements and speeches by President Putin in 2015 presented Russian support for President al-Assad as a rejection of perceived U.S Middle East policy, at September 2015 Collective Security Treaty Organization Conference took place in, Tajikistan. Putin urged the US and its allies "to set aside geopolitical ambitions, leave behind the so-called double standards and the policy of direct or indirect use of individual terrorist groups to achieve one's own opportunistic goals, including changes in undesirable governments and regimes"

NATO response has been backed by the United States, although Ukraine is not a member in the NATO, could not intervene on behalf of the country. However, The NATO intervened by providing military trainers to assist Ukraine, creation of new NATO trust funds to help develop Ukraine defense capacity (Belkin,Mix&Woehrel,2014,p5). Because Russian invasion of Ukraine is a threat to European stability.

United States posed sanctions against Russia as it made it clear that Russia should pay for its actions (Larsen,2014,p22) that resulted in weakening Russian economy. Moreover, it help the Ukrainian government with \$1 billion loan and \$150 million as a financial assistance and supported the pro-European forces in Ukraine to support its sovereignty (Belkin,Mix&Woehrel,2014,p5). Russia considered United States and NATO backing Ukraine against its interests is undermining Russia's sphere of influence.

To conclude, system level of analysis and the power transition theory helped to further understand Russian foreign policy behavior in Syria. As Russia actions were a reaction to United States and NATO actions in the international system. In addition to, the power transition theory is part of neo-realism it further explains that Russia makes this action to maintain its national interests in the region, to protect their national security and their survival. Russia felt betrayed by its west partners in the Ukraine crisis because of their support of regime change, in Libya when the NATO intervened for the purpose to protect civilians and then resulted in regime change. That lead to its stance in Syria as it perceived United States and NATO forces undermining its interests in its sphere of influence. Russia wanted to limit the enlargement of NATO as it does not want to expand more in the Middle East and want to limit the power and the interest of NATO.

Moreover, Russia ambition to re-emerge as a great power had let it to maintain its geo-strategic position in the region as its involvement in the internal affairs in Syria can be seen. Also, its intervention did make the west interact and cooperate with it toward a peaceful solution for Syria. Russia believes that during 1990s the west (United States and NATO) took advantage of Russia weakness and built the world order without them. Thus, whatever happened in Syria, Russia will make sure that whoever will replace Al-Assad will not undermine its interests.

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To What Degree does Globalization Limit China's Autonomy?

Mennatullah Ehab Ahmed Mohamed

Introduction:

Haque (1998) observes that the globalization phenomenon began during the last quarter of the twentieth century. According to Shangquan (2000), globalization has three main dimensions: Economic, political, and cultural. This paper will focus on the implications of economic globalization. Shangquan (2000) states that economic globalization is driven by two main forces: The rapid growth of information and technologies in all types of productive activities; and the rapid growth of marketization. In other words, he states that the growth of cross border trade of commodities, services, and capital, and the dominance of the capitalist system have led to economic globalization. He also observes that his reality is accompanied by the rapid spread of technology and the continual expansion of markets.

Literature Review:

Scholars have been tackling the consequences of this phenomenon on state autonomy from different perspectives. A group of scholars, including Moises Naim, Shamsul Haque, and Jung Kim, argue that economic globalization negatively affects the autonomy of states. Kim (1999) argues that economic globalization is based on creating a consolidated global marketplace for production, distribution, and consumption. Thus, he states that the global market's control and power over the nation-states will, eventually, increase leading to the erosion of the nation-state's ability to control its economic, social, and political dimensions within its own territory. Furthermore, Haque (1998) and Naim (2009) both argue that economic globalization is one of the main causes of global inequality, unfair trade, insecurity, and financial crises as it widens the gap between the South and North countries.

Another group of scholars, including Maria Gritsch, Thomas Friedman, and Katherine Barbieri, argue that economic globalization positively affects the autonomy of states. Friedman (1999) argues that "Globalization is likely to lead to more peace" as economic globalization brings the McDonaldization process to the society. However, as Friedman observes this process requires a society to have reached a certain level of economic development and to have a sufficient middle class to support this process. Thus, he argues that this middle class will not be interested in fighting wars anymore. Friedman's point is that as a result of economic globalization, which is portrayed in the global expansion of McDonald's restaurants, countries that have made strong economic ties with each other have too much to lose to ever go to a war with each other.

Furthermore, Gritsch (2005) and Barbieri (2005) both argue that as nation-states promote economic globalization, they acquire more power and autonomy. They argue that states use their economic means in order to achieve three main goals: International geo-political hegemony, power from, and autonomy over their national economies and societies. After reviewing the literature of the effects of economic globalization on state autonomy, it seems that there are comparatively few studies tackling modern Chinese economic history.

Research Question:

This paper explores the process through which China, the world's second largest economy, has transformed from economic isolation to economic globalization. It then examines the effects of each stage on China's autonomy. This paper argues that economic globalization has benefited the Chinese economy and has positively affected china's autonomy more than economic isolation. This is primarily because the Belt and Road Initiative, as a form of globalization, will enable China to have access to new markets and untapped resources; it will also lead to economic growth, develop the land-locked western regions in China, reduce the ethnic tensions in these regions, and revive China's historical dominance in the world.

In approaching this topic this paper utilizes rational choice theory according to Daniel Little. It also utilizes China as a case study, and comparative analysis technique between economic isolation in China during late imperial China and economic globalization in China during the twenty-first century in order to examine the effects of each stage on China's autonomy.

This paper is divided into four sections. The first section applies the rational choice theory according to Daniel Little to understand the economic behavior of China. The second section tackles the implications of China's economic isolation during late imperial China on its autonomy. The third section tackles the implications of China's economic globalization during twenty-first century on its autonomy. The fourth section highlights China's internal factors, economic, strategic, and historical factors, that drives China's opening up policy and their impacts on China's autonomy.

Theoretical Framework:

Little (1991) argues that "Rational choice theory is a school of thought based on the assumption that human actions and behaviours are goal-directed". Little clarifies that humans have a set of interests in terms of which they evaluate different opportunities. He also argues that humans evaluate the costs and benefits of each opportunity, and then they choose an action that suits the best opportunity they have chosen. Little applies this theory on China's economy to understand China's economic policies since late imperial China.

Little (1991) believes that China's transformation from economic isolation to economic globalization is derived from its desire to achieve global prestige, especially, after the failure of the economic isolation policy. Little continues to argue that China has lost its global prestige because of the momentous impacts of the failed economic isolation policy. He believes that one of the major and momentous impacts of this policy is the great famine in China that has happened during 1958 and 1961. Ashton, Hill, Piazza, and Zeitz (1984) argue that the Great Chinese Famine was primarily because of the economic mismanagement under the emperor Mao Zedong. According to Ashton, Hill, Piazza, and Zeitz, during this famine the birth rate was declined by 50%, the death rate was doubled, and there was a severe drought. However, they argue that rail transport and international relief efforts have saved China by providing grain, which contributed in reducing the number of famine deaths.

China's Economic Isolation during late imperial China:

Deng (1997) believes that "China is often portrayed as a country isolated from the outside world, self-sufficient, and insulated from capitalism during late imperial China." Deng argues that China had a prosperous domestic trade with marginal or even not existed foreign trade. Perkins (1983) states that during this period Chinese Emperors, such as Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1644-1912), concentrated more on self-reliance, and for them self-reliance meant reducing and restricting China's foreign trade. Moreover, Deng (1997) states that Chinese Emperors tried to monopolize every sector within China including the domestic and foreign trade. However, he argues that unlike the domestic trade which was fully monopolized by the Emperors, such as the trade of salt, wine, and metal within China, the foreign trade was often beyond the reach of the government's control, so they worked on restricting China's foreign trade.

Smuggling and undermining China's autonomy:

Accordingly, Deng (1997) states that private foreign trade was banned during late imperial China in order to protect the government's monopoly system. However, Deng argues that the ban policy was not effective as it merely led to smuggling, which was threatening the autonomy of China. Deng continues by stating that Smuggling during the Ming-Qing era was on a wider scale than it was before in China's history; leading the smugglers to take control of all of China's overseas trade.

Moreover, Mackay (2013) states that smugglers during Ming-Qing era established sophisticated organizations such as the Jiang-Zhe-Wan group operating in Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Anhui and the Min-Guang group operating in Fujian and Guangdong. Mackay observes that under these groups were thirteen sub-groups with several thousands of members, including both males and females, and with more than one hundred ships. Mackay (2013) also states that smugglers have built many ports

to support their activities. Eventually, they succeeded in developing international relations with many other countries and in undermining the Chinese Emperors' authority.

China's Economic Globalization and the Belt and Road Initiative:

Based on rational choice theory's assumptions discussed above and Little's statement that China has lost its global prestige due to the failure of the economic isolation policy and the momentous impacts of this policy, the Great Chinese Famine and smuggling. It was from the rationality to transform to the opposite policy, the economic globalization policy.

Ding and Li (2017) argues that "In recent decades, China has emerged as a main player in international trade. Seizing the opportunity of fast development caused by the reforms of the economic regime and tapping into the process of globalization." Ding and Li clarifies that since the economic reforms and the opening up policy of the late 1970s, Chinese authorities have been putting new strategies in order to increase the pace and enhance the opening up policy.

Ding and Li (2017) believes that this was crystalized during the twenty-first century when the Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the so-called Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project in 2013. According to Ingle and Golley (2018), "President Xi strongly rejected the protectionism policy and he likened it to locking oneself in a dark room. While wind and rain may be kept outside, that dark room will also block light and air." In another words, they state that President Xi declared his commitment to free trade, including open, transparent and win-win regional free trade agreements.

Ding and Li (2017) observe that the main targets of this project are to build a new Eurasian land bridge, to develop land, sea, and air transport routes, and to facilitate open and inclusive regional economic cooperation. Furthermore, Yujie (2018) argues that the massive BRI requires building a multi-dimensional infrastructure network and massive transnational trade between China, Central Asia, Russia, Europe, North Africa, and The Gulf Countries. Murphy (2016) argues that the BRI encompasses more than half of the population of the world, territory, and economic activities.

The Belt and Road Initiative's positive effects on China's autonomy:

Murphy agrees with Friedman, Gritsch, and Barbieri, the scholars mentioned above in the literature review, that economic globalization positively affects state autonomy, and brings peace and prosperity. Murphy (2016) highlights that the Chinese authorities believe that the BRI reduces ethnic tensions in the less-developed western regions in China, such as Xinjiang region, by integrating those regions into the Chinese economy. Murphy proves his point of view by stating that the BRI would transform Xinjiang region, and many other less-developed Chinese regions, into an energy corridor for Eurasia and create new opportunities to exploit its untapped resources. Moreover, the BRI will give China the access to the required natural resources within the BRI's involved countries as the BRI controls 75% of the known energy reserves and it controls 30% of the world GDP (Fruend & Ruta, 2018).

Internal factors that drives China's opening up policy and their impacts on China's autonomy:

Although the rational choice theory helps to elaborate President XI's choice to initiate the BRI project in the context of the BRI's positive impacts on China's autonomy, this initiative is also driven by other internal factors, economic, historical, and strategic factors, in China itself, which will also positively impact its autonomy (Minghao, 2015). Minghao states that compared with late imperial China, as discussed above, President Xi's foreign policy is now more aggressive and globally-driven, and has abandoned the 'keeping a low profile in the international community' policy.

Economic Factors:

Economically speaking, the rising economic interdependency of the twenty-first globalization era makes the BRI an important instrument for China to flex and advance its financial and economic interests abroad (Murphy, 2016). Initiating the BRI serves one of China's key objectives of its foreign policy agenda towards Asian countries, which is to maintain friendly ties with other Asian countries (Nie, 2016). Murphy perceives that this project enables China to build and strengthen such ties by forging strong bilateral trade and promoting regional economic integration through the improvement of connectivity in the context of modernizing their infrastructure and cross-border transport.

Additionally, according to economic geography theorists, this will lead China to achieve economic prosperity (Zhang & Ji, 2015). Zhang and Ji believe that this is primarily because they argue that connectivity and infrastructure improvement is the shortcut to economic growth as they play momentous role in overcoming the hardships of backward geographical conditions and in reducing high costs of production in landlocked countries. They also argue that the theorists' assumptions were proven in the comparative cross-regional study done by Luis Serven and Cesar Calderon which shows the significance of infrastructure improvement contribution to economic prosperity in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Furthermore, Nie (2016) argues that China's economy is largely based on its massive export-oriented industries, which means that it needs to import large quantities of raw materials and intermediate components. Thus, he believes that it is very crucial to China to have a reliable and secure maritime trade shipping line which the BRI will provide on larger scale. Accordingly, the BRI will enable China to forge strong economic relationships with other Asian countries, improve its infrastructure, and achieve economic prosperity, which in turn will positively affect its autonomy.

Moreover, Chinese companies find strong incentives under the BRI as it enables them to invest their capital more in other countries, which will increase their profits and expand their global business operations (Ghiasy & Zhou, 2017). According to Ghiasy and Zhou (2017), the BRI will open new markets and make it easier to access these markets for China's enormous excess of manufactured goods. As a result, they argue that the export of 'made in China' products will contribute to absorption of more of China's manufactured goods, such as aluminum, iron, steel, and cement, which will stimulate and enhance China's domestic economic growth and will eventually strengthen its autonomy. The BRI will also help China to address its need to engage with the other fast emerging Asian markets, such as India, Thailand, and Taiwan, and other European and African markets that are planned to participate in the BRI (Ujvari, 2019).

Strategic factors:

Additionally, strategically speaking, the BRI will enable China's land-locked western regions, such as Yunnan and Xinjiang to participate in global trade and develop internal economic integration which will also positively affect its autonomy (Murphy, 2016). Therefore, Murphy perceives that by implementing the BRI, inter-regional connectivity of these western regions will be improved and will allow them to directly access the neighboring countries' port facilities.

Yunnan, for example, shares its borders with three of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar (Ujvari, 2019). Ujvari states that Yunnan province is also close to India and Bangladesh in South Asia, and Cambodia and Thailand in Southeast Asia. He argues that this strategic and geographical advantage enables Yunnan to become a key gateway for China's BRI strategy to many neighboring countries.

Historical factors:

Finally, historically speaking, one of the major rationale behind China's BRI is to revive China's historical Silk Road (Arduino, 2016). Arduino states that the BRI echoes China's dream of restoring its historical dominance in the world and the great revival of the Chinese nation. The so-called China's dream was first announced by President XI in 2013; he stated that "young people should dare to dream, work assiduously to fulfill the dreams and contribute to the revitalization of the nation" (Heberer, 2014). Heberer highlights that the so-called Chinese dream is about national glory, collective effort, and China's growth and prosperity.

Thus, according to Arduino (2016), the BRI is perceived by the Chinese leadership and nation as the first major step towards regaining China's historical global position and towards fulfilling the Chinese dream. Moreover, China's proactive foreign policy towards globalization and the initiation of the BRI have been highly influenced by the Chinese people's increasing sense of national pride that has accompanied China's emergence as the world's second largest economy (Arduino, 2016). Thus, Arduino believes that they view that the BRI is a necessary match to China's ascendancy as a rising global power that will contribute in regaining its pre-eminence in the world. Accordingly, the BRI plays a momentous role in the minds of the Chinese nation as a whole, and its implementation will eventually lead to more autonomy (Arduino, 2016).

Conclusions:

Based on rational choice theory according to Daniel Little, it is believed that economic globalization has benefited China more than economic isolation. It has also contributed to the establishment of China as a key player in both the economic and political arena. Moreover, economic globalization in China and its prosperous achievements on the economic, strategic, and nationalist sentimental/historical level have given the Chinese Communist Party more legitimacy than before. Thus, the establishment of the BRI project, as a method to accelerate the opening up policy, is an ambitious endeavor by President Xi to develop regional cooperation and connectivity on a trans-continental scale, and to increase China's influence in both the economic and political arena. Eventually, the BRI will positively impact China's autonomy.

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The Decision Environment and its Impact on the Effectiveness of the Israeli Decisions During the 2006 War

Rita Helal Awad Youssef

Introduction:

On the 12th of July 2006, Hezbollah members took a provocative approach against Israel for they crossed the Israeli borders, killed three soldiers and kidnapped two others (Kober, 2008). As a response, Israel waged a large-scale war against Hezbollah, and although the Israel Defence forces (IDF) managed to minimize the opponent's power, the outcomes of this war were not satisfactory from the Israeli perspective (Makovsky & White, 2006). Hence, the purpose of this paper is to critically examine the impact of the 'decision environment' on the effectiveness of the Israeli decision to wage a war against Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006.

Thus, the paper argues that the stress created by the social pressures; the lack of reliable information about Hezbollah military capabilities; the overestimation of the IDF military forces; the time constraints, and the familiarity effect are all factors that lead to wishful thinking as well as non-heuristic searches. Consequently, they had affected the effectiveness of the decisions taken by the Israeli policy-makers in the 2006 war.

Accordingly, the paper is divided into four sections: the first section tackles the conceptual framework of the "decision-making environment". The second section analyses the domestic social pressures prior to and during the crisis for they had created a stressful environment and led to quick and ineffective decisions done by the Israeli policy-makers. The third section focuses on the lack of a coherent and prepared attack based on cost-benefit analysis; instead, the policy-makers did not have enough reliable information on Hezbollah's military capabilities and overestimated the Israeli military forces. This section explains that these two factors had led to ambiguity and confusion. The fourth section shows the effect of time constraints on the effectiveness of the decisions that had been taken during the crisis. This section also shows that due to the time constraints, the policy-makers did not use proper cost-benefit analysis to evaluate the different alternatives; instead, they relied on analogies with previous experiences with Hezbollah, which at the end resulted in ineffective decisions that did not meet the initial Israeli goals.

Conceptual Framework

In order to analyse the impact of the decision-making environment on the effectiveness of the decisions taken by the Israeli policy-makers in 2006, it is important to start by defining the decision environment and its characteristics. In fact, the decision environment is characterised by eight main factors: time constraints, information constraints, ambiguity, familiarity, dynamic setting, risk, stress, and accountability (Mintz & DeRouen, 2010). All these factors affect the way decision-makers deal with foreign policy crises and the strategic decisions that they choose to make (Mintz & DeRouen, 2010)

Firstly, time constraints are critical and should be taken into consideration in the analysis of the decision environment. In fact, foreign policy crises usually require quick actions to contain problems and emergencies; thus, these time constraints limit the ability of the policy-makers to do proper cost-benefit analysis (Renshon & Renshon, 2008). Secondly, both the lack of credible information and the excessive amount of information can lead to confusion among the policy-makers (Mintz & DeRouen, 2010). Thirdly, ambiguity and confusion can also be caused by the availability of credible information with multiple and contradictory meanings (Mintz & DeRouen, 2010). Fourthly, the familiarity factor is also important to consider while analysing the decision environment for decision-makers tend to rely on analogies with previous experiences that appear to be similar to the issue that they are dealing with (Payne, Bettman & Johnson, 1993 as cited in Mintz & DeRouen, 2010). This idea impacts the effectiveness of the final decision since every problem has its own characteristics and in order to efficiently deal with it, a cost-benefit analysis should be done to evaluate each alternative.

Fifthly, during crises, the dynamic setting requires continuous evaluation of the situation while taking into consideration the interests of the different parties concerned; this fact creates a more complicated decision environment (Mintz & DeRouen, 2010). Sixthly, the time constraints and the lack of reliable information can lead the policy-makers to make decisions of high risk with limited calculations (Mintz & DeRouen, 2010). Thus, the risk factor can also lead to ineffective decisions. The seventh characteristic is related to the stress level that can be an outcome of complicated problems, time constraints, or limited capabilities and it can lead to the reliance on cognitive shortcuts and oversimplification of the problem (Renshon & Renshon, 2008). Finally, accountability is the last characteristic of the decision environment; in fact, when the policy-makers are accountable to the people, the social pressures and the importance of the domestic support make them eager to take effective decisions to satisfy the citizens (Mintz & DeRouen, 2010).

Lastly, it is important to note that the aforementioned factors do not affect the orientation of the state's foreign policy; however, their impact on the effectiveness of the decisions taken by the policy-makers is important and worth being empirically analysed using the Israeli-Hezbollah war in 2006.

Stress and Social Pressure:

After the attack, Ehud Olmert, then-prime minister of Israel had set a number of objectives to be met by the IDF in the war including the rescue of the hostages, the deployment of the Lebanese army in all the state including the southern part, and the exclusion of Hezbollah from the area (Glenn, 2012). However, the results of the war were not satisfactory from the Israeli point of view for its costs exceeded its benefits and there were different strategic errors and deviations from the initial plans (Glenn, 2012). Furthermore, the failure of the war can be further illustrated by the words of Meir Degan who is the Director of Mossad, and Yuval Diskan, the head of the Israeli security agency Shin Bet as both stated that "the war was a national catastrophe and Israel suffered a critical blow" (Matthews, 2008, p. 2). Accordingly, the decisions taken during the crisis were not effective, a fact that can be partially explained by the complicated decision environment.

Firstly, stress had a significant impact on the effectiveness of the decision taken by the policy-makers during the war. This stress had been caused by a number of factors including domestic social pressures. Olmert, then-prime minister, did not have strong domestic support as statistics show that only 35% of Israelis approved his performance after the first month of his term (Makovsky & White, 2006). Meanwhile, only 31% of the population supported Peterz, the minister of defence (Makovsky & White, 2006). These low percentages show that the public had been originally dissatisfied with the government; this fact stresses the policy-makers who need to boost their public support while constantly feeling that their decisions are questioned (Makovsky & White, 2006). Moreover, the stress level became even more important after the daring move of Hamas to kill two soldiers in June 2006; and shortly after, Hezbollah took their provocative move against Israel (Makovsky & White, 2006). These moves made the public even more resentful and created a stressful environment for the policy-makers.

Furthermore, social pressures had been significant during the conflict. In fact, it is important to note that according to Shaul Mofaz, a former minister of defence and chief of staff, the Israeli public is sensitive to civilian casualties and the number of deaths in wars (Kober, 2008). Thus, it is preferable for Israel to launch wars outside its own territories in order to minimize the number of casualties and to maintain domestic support. However, the war in 2006 had caused significant instabilities within the boundaries of the state for Hezbollah attacked the Israeli economy and targeted the civilians in order to spread fear and terror (Kober, 2008). They were able to reach 160 cities and villages (Makovsky & White, 2006). Consequently, around one million people had to move to shelters, hundreds of thousands had to be displaced and statistics show that a third of the Israeli population had been susceptible to attacks from Hezbollah rockets (Makovsky & White, 2006). Hence, all these unforeseen consequences of the war increased public resentment while pressuring the policy-makers.

Lack of reliable information and overestimation of the IDF capabilities:

Along with the domestic pressures, stress had also been caused by the lack of reliable information about Hezbollah's military capabilities. In fact, despite all the Israeli efforts to fight it, the organization managed to fire around one hundred rockets daily until the end of the conflict (Makovsky

& White, 2006). In addition, the group was able to reach Galilee, a region at the centre of Israel (Makovsky & White, 2006). Furthermore, Hezbollah members attacked an Israeli naval warship with a special missile and this move had been unexpected by the policy-makers for an Israeli official stated that “we were not aware that Hezbollah possessed this kind of missile.” (Matthews, 2008, p.38). Moreover, the IDF did not have reliable information about the exact location of Hezbollah members (Kober, 2008). Thus, This lack of information had spread fear, terror, and stress across the state and created further ambiguity and confusion among the policy-makers. (Makovsky & White, 2006)

On the other hand, the overestimation of Israel's military forces has had a role in minimizing the effectiveness of the decisions taken. In fact, Olmert, on the 17th of July 2006, had announced the goal of the operations to be the end of Hezbollah's military power and he considered this goal to be achievable given the highly trained soldiers and the sophisticated weapons at the disposal of the Israeli military (Matthews, 2008). However, this goal had not been met as the IDF had only been able to slightly minimize Hezbollah's power but did not end it (Matthews, 2008). Statistics show that the Israeli Air Forces only hit 7% of Hezbollah's resources (Matthews, 2008). An IDF official explained that this low percentage is due to a lack of some basic military skills and tactics as he stated that “It is one thing to give the troops maps, target list, etc. It's another thing to be trained for the mission—they weren't trained.” (Matthews, 2008, p.44). Moreover, the IDF Chief of Staff Gen. Dan Halutz highlighted the overestimation of Israel's military force by the policy-makers as he states that “They assumed that within ten days, two weeks, Hizballah's spine would be broken and it would all work out.” (Makovsky & White, 2006, p. 60).

Furthermore, in order to attack Hezbollah, the policy-makers decided to use Cluster bombs and estimated the failure rate of these arms to be around 10% (Alagha, 2008). However, Israeli bombs were old for they were bought from the United States (USA) in the 1970s; thus, their failure rate reached 40% while causing an important number of civilian casualties (Alagha, 2008). This incident caused the death of 25 civilians and the injury of 185 others leading to a loss of international support for the Israeli actions (Alagha, 2008). Thus, this event is also an illustration of the overestimation of the IDF military capabilities, which created more tension and ambiguity among the policy-makers and led to ineffective decisions (Alagha, 2008).

Time constraints and analogies:

In addition to the social pressures and the lack of reliable information, time constraints have also had an impact on the effectiveness of the decisions that had been taken during the conflict. As a result of the loss of the soldiers who were killed by Hamas group, and shortly after this event, Hezbollah kidnapped other Israeli soldiers, the policy-makers felt pressured to make quick decisions in order to deter these organizations and to rescue the hostages (Matthews, 2008). Thus, there were time constraints at the beginning of the crisis for the decision-makers to take a quick step; and accordingly, there was little time for sophisticated cost-benefit analysis in order to come up with the best plan to fight back.

Moreover, Israel faced important pressures to end the war after around 30 days of confrontation. In fact, as explained previously, Hezbollah had reached the civilian population and the economy leading to many instabilities in the state (Kober, 2008). The effect of the war on the Israeli civilians had been significant for it caused the loss of 42, the injury of 4262, and thousands of civilians had been psychologically treated for “shock and anxiety” (Matthews, 2008).

Furthermore, it is important to note that long confrontations tend to cause heavy civilian casualties and this idea induces international condemnation; thus, war objectives should be met quickly. In the case of the Hezbollah-Israel war, the IDF destroyed major Lebanese infrastructure and killed around one thousand Lebanese civilians (Cordesman, Sullivan, & Sullivan, 2007). These facts had led to harsh international pressures forcing Israel to adopt a cease-fire. The United Nations Resolution of 1701 condemned the deadly conflict between the two parties and asked for a quick end of confrontations (Farquhar, 2009). As a result, the policy-makers were pressured for they realized that the war should end while the goals had not been met.

Thus, the policy-makers tended to rely on analogies with previous experience in order to achieve their goals instead of assessing the situation based on cost-benefit analysis. In fact, Israel had fought against Hezbollah in the 1980s; moreover, they have had different conflicts in the 1990s

including the Operations Accountability in 1993 (Rodman, 2019). However, these confrontations had been limited in scale, and since that time, Hezbollah members had been able to adapt and innovate their capabilities (Rodman, 2019). However, the reliance on analogies with previous experiences led the policy-makers to overlook the adaptation of Hezbollah's military forces, and hence, the familiarity factor had caused ambiguity and stress.

Thus, due to these time constraints, the policy-makers used wishful thinking, heuristic devices, and started improvising to achieve the war's objectives. This idea is illustrated by the words of the former chief of staff, Moshe Yaalon who explained in an interview that: "deviation from the plan on some sort of false feeling that there is a military means to pulverize Hezbollah ... they started to improvise" (Makovsky & White, 2006, p.14).

Moreover, as part of the wishful thinking, the policy-makers decided to increase the intensity of the ground operations (Matthews, 2008). This decision had been costly and insignificant since according to Makovsky and White (2006), limited military operations should have been done as a response to the provocative moves of Hezbollah. Instead, the Israeli policy-makers had decided to wage a large-scale war against Hezbollah in Lebanon without enough cost-benefit analysis. As a result, the costs of the war were higher than its benefits from the Israeli perspective since Hezbollah gained more support for their actions while portraying themselves as the only group that resisted Israel (Emiliana, 2007 as cited in Fontana, 2010). Furthermore, the war had resulted in creating a significant psychological doubt within the Israeli citizens regarding the efficiency of the government and their military capabilities (Matthews, 2008).

Conclusions:

The decision-making environment has an important impact on the effectiveness of the decisions taken by the policy-makers. This impact is shown in the case of the Israeli policy-makers' decision to wage a large scale war against Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006. In that case, the policy-makers had been pressured by the public opinion as they initially did not have domestic support for their performance and the consequences of the war made the public even more resentful. These social pressures created a stressful environment for the decision-makers leading them to take quick and ineffective decisions. Furthermore, the lack of reliable information about Hezbollah's military capabilities and the overestimation of the IDF military forces had led to ambiguity and confusion. In addition, time constraints had pressured the policy-makers for they had to rescue the hostages and to finish the confrontation quickly to limit international condemnation, the loss of domestic support, economic problems, and war casualties. These time constraints had led the policy-makers to rely on the familiarity elements using heuristic devices and analogies instead of making a proper and sophisticated cost-benefit analysis.

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Part III
Human Rights

Human Trafficking: A Modern Form of Slavery? A Case Study of the Turkish Efforts Towards Combating Human Trafficking

Mariam Hussein Kamal Eldin Hussein

Introduction:

Human trafficking exists as a modern form of slavery and is considered a paramount degrading crime against humanity. Furthermore, with the end of the monolithic international structure and the fall of the former Soviet Union, migratory movements have, unprecedentedly, escalated (Yildiz, 2017, pp. 35-50). These movements led to myriad negative consequences like the fall of migrants into the networks of human traffickers. Human trafficking constitutes now a great threat to the international community (Chamic, 2015, pp.77-88). In light of this context, this paper utilises a country-based case study to enable a better understanding of the issue. The paper analyses Turkey's policies towards human trafficking at two different frameworks; the first covers the period after the fall of the Soviet Union, USSR in which Slavic countries represented the majority of the trafficked people. The second analyses the reasons behind the shift from Slavic countries after 2007 to citizens of Central Asia. This paper aims to examine the main reasons behind human trafficking in Turkey and the major challenges that it faced while combating human trafficking.

The paper argues that the internal conflicts witnessed in the Slavic countries and Central Asia are the pivotal factors behind the increasing human trafficking rates in Turkey. In other words, it can be argued that the political instability that led to economic hardship is the main catalyst behind the increasing human trafficking rates. The paper is divided into three main sections. Section one defines human trafficking by analysing the definition of the Palermo protocol and highlights the differences between human trafficking and smuggling. Section two then explains the push and pull factors that catalysed human trafficking in Turkey focusing on sex trafficking as it is a pivotal type of human trafficking there. Finally, section three analyses the challenges that Turkey faced while implementing comprehensive responses to deal with this problematic issue.

1. What is human trafficking; the Palermo protocol

Human trafficking, also known as trafficking in persons, is defined in the Palermo protocol—that was drafted by the United Nations in 2000—as the subjection, recruitment or harbouring of children, women and men for the purpose of compelled service and exploitation (Chamic, 2015, pp.77-88). Exploitation includes forced labour or services, sexual exploitation, slavery, the removal of organs and the use of child soldiers. These acts are done by use of force, means of threat or other forms of deception and abduction. By analysing this definition, it can be stated that there are three key components of trafficking in persons which are the act, the purpose and the means (Konrad, 2002, pp.43-48). To prevent common misinterpretations, it is important to elucidate the difference between trafficking and smuggling. By analysing the Palermo Protocol, it can be clarified that the main difference between human trafficking and human smuggling is the consent of the people (Shelley, 2010, pp.8-12). Human smuggling could be defined as the provision of a certain service, frequently, illegal transportation to enter a foreign country, with the consent of the people to that service. It ends when the people enter their desired destination by the help of the smugglers (Toktas & Selimoglu, 2019, pp.135-140). Furthermore, those people are defined in the Palermo Protocol as the willing contributors in a criminal action who should be granted “humane treatments and full protection of their rights”. On the contrary the immigration law of the United States, US, stipulates that the smuggled migrants should be deported and that “an illegal alien who consents to be smuggled is complicit in a criminal activity and may therefore be subject to prosecution and removal” (Shelley, 2010, pp.8-12). This further indicates the difficulty and ambiguity of policies regarding the way the smuggled people should be treated. Moreover, a major difference between human trafficking and smuggling is that the latter is considered a crime against the state, while trafficking is the crime against a person who should be given

immigration relief, protection and government assistance. Also, it is important to note that the existence of coercion, fraud and force is what distinguishes trafficking from smuggling (Toktas & Selimoglu, 2019, pp.135-140).

2.1 Brief overview of the case study

Turkey is considered an intersection of the migratory flows. Thus, the dimensions and root causes of trafficking in Turkey and its strategy to overcome this issue will set forth meaningful analysis and ensure a better explanation of the issue. Turkey's central and geostrategic location made it a destination country for a huge number of irregular migrants and it helped human traffickers achieve their atrocious aims (Lindstrom, 2005, pp.39-48). According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, UNODC's report of 2006, Turkey ranks very high risk as a destination country for human trafficking, this further emphasises the importance of analysing such a critical case study. Turkey, since the very beginning, suffer from sex trade and thus, human trafficking in Turkey is mainly assessed in the form of what is known as "sex trafficking" (Tepe & Maviyildiz, 2014, pp. 40-50). The historical root causes of trafficking in Turkey in general and sex trafficking in specific goes back to myriad reasons which will be thoroughly divided into push factors in the Slavic countries and Central Asia and pull factors in Turkey (Tepe & Maviyildiz, 2014, pp. 40-50).

2.2 The push and pull factors

The push factors are represented through three predominant aspects.

First, the economic aspect like poverty, unequal distribution of labour, low level of income and inadequate employment. Thus, it can be argued that the economic inequality had a paramount contribution in increasing human trafficking rates (Vreja, 2005, pp. 49-62).

The *second* important aspect is the political reasons which play a pivotal role because of the internal conflicts that, unprecedentedly, escalated after the collapse of the USSR and the Yugoslav wars. The rationale behind stressing on the importance of the internal conflicts as a major reason behind human trafficking is because they are considered the prerequisites of political turmoil, corruption, instability and domestic violence (Koolace & Esfahani, 2014, pp.181-190).

Thirdly, as a result of the political instability, many social factors emerge like high levels of crime, insecurity, social unrest, ethnic clashes and ease of transportation and communication.

All of these aforementioned factors eventually led to the increase in the number of needy people who, unintentionally, get exploited and entrapped and fall in the hand of human traffickers (Tverdova, 2011, pp. 329–344). This explains why Turkey suffered from massive human trafficking rates from the Slavic countries right after the collapse of the USSR. Moving to the shift that happened from Slavic countries to Central Asian countries substantially in 2007; when new autonomous regions like Nagorno Karabakh and Chechnya sought independence. Internal conflicts and economic deterioration shadowed as a consequence; thus, these countries saw Turkey as "an engine of relative prosperity" (Burnashev, 2007, pp.65-70).

As shown in figure 1 and 2, there is a noticeable shift of victims from being mainly citizens of Russia, Moldova or Ukraine to being mainly Turkmen and Uzbeks.

Moreover, the Turkish Report on Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime indicated in 2010 that the citizens of Central Asia account for about 73% of the total number of trafficked victims. These salient shifts could be interpreted as a natural consequence after the security cooperation projects that occurred between Turkey and the Slavic countries or the boost of the economy of those countries. For further exemplification, Romania's economic growth after joining the European Union is a major reason behind the decline in the number of the Romanian sex trafficking victims in Turkey (Demir and Finckenaue, 2010). Within this context, the link between the factors, that catalysed human trafficking in the Slavic countries and the Central Asian countries to Turkey, that were formerly discussed, can be precisely summarised in two main aspects which are political and economic. The internal conflicts and the economic hardship that Central Asia and the Slavic countries witnessed led to the multiplication of the cost of the basic necessities. Consequently, the rates of starvation and untenable debts increased and, eventually, the conditions were ripe for human trafficking (Shelley,2010, pp.53-60). These

devastating effects pushed many people into the sex industry in Turkey leading to the increase in the number of sex trafficking rates (Tepe & Maviyildiz, 2014, pp. 40-50).

Figure 1: The Number of Human Trafficking Victims in Turkey in 2006





Figure 2: The Number of Human Trafficking Victims in Turkey in 2011



Source: Burnashev, 2007, pp.65-70

The flip side of the issue, which is the pull factors in Turkey, also had a monumental role in catalysing human trafficking there. Turkey’s central location made the short distances, between it and Central Asia and Europe, a privilege for human traffickers; also, it is seen as a passage for European sex industry (Yildiz, 2017, pp. 35-50). Furthermore, many Turkic countries that speak the Turkish language—like Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Kazakhstan, Bulgaria, Abkhazia in Georgia, Moldova and some parts of the Russian Federation like Dagestan—were attracted to Turkey due to the cultural closeness that is considered another major pull factor (Demir & Fiinckenauer, 2010, 55-65). By digging deeper into the pull factors, it appeared to be that more than half of human trafficking victims only have secondary education and that about 65% of those victims are actually younger than 25 years old. Furthermore, those victims’ intention was to get a job, independently, in domestic work in Turkey; however, most of them end up falling into the network of human traffickers (Demir & Fiinckenauer, 2010, 55-65). Thereby, this shows that human trafficking rates are high in Turkey because it is a paramount connection point of three main continents that has a very well-developed network of human trafficking that hunts the younger, inexperienced and less educated migrants coming from Slavic and Central Asian countries. Moreover, Turkey’s relative political and economic stability intrigued many illegal migrants (Tepe & Maviyildiz, 2014, pp. 40-50). In light of this, the paper will analyse the direct causal relationship between illegal migration and the escalation of human trafficking rates in the following section.


3. The challenges to the implementation of comprehensive responses

Although Turkey faced many challenges, its comprehensive responses to human trafficking still managed to decrease the number of the victims. As shown in figure 3, the awareness programs, enforcement of mechanisms and the increased livelihood contributed in the substantial decline in the number of trafficked people from 2004 to 2011; the number of the victims in 2005—which was about 256 victims—was three times more than that in 2011 (Zhidkova & Demir, 2016, pp.30-45).

In addition, Turkey’s governmental and non-governmental organisations were incorporated into the framework of the establishment of the National Task Force on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings in 2002 that was created by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Lindstrom, 2005, pp.39-48). This cooperation further helped in combating human trafficking; for exemplification, the Human Resources Development Foundation signed many protocols with Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality which led to

the assistance of about 770 cases by the International Organisation for Migration, IOM, from 2000 to 2010 (Yildiz, 2017, pp. 35-50). Turkey has also acted in coordination with other states to combat human trafficking. It has promoted about 157 local helplines in its own country as well as in the source countries and it has signed bilateral security agreements and protocols with many countries like Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia (Lindstrom, 2005, pp.39-48). Furthermore, article 80 in the new Turkish penal code, that came into force in 2005, prohibited both forced labour and sex trafficking. It stipulated that whoever provides, transfers, shelters or kidnaps another person or a group of persons from one place to another—by force or unlawfully—shall be sentenced to imprisonment from seven to twelve years (Tepe & Maviyildiz, 2014, pp. 40-50). However, this article was criticized in 2013 by the Trafficking in Persons Report because it was seen as “a prohibition of movement rather than an explicit manifestation of human trafficking ban”. This criticism constructed a major challenge for Turkey (Tepe & Maviyildiz, 2014, pp. 40-50).

Figure 3: The Number of human Trafficking Victims from 2004 till 2011



Source: Zhidkova & Demir, 2016, pp.30-45.

Furthermore, one of the major challenges that hinders the effect of the comprehensive responses implemented by Turkey to combat human trafficking is illegal migration. For an illegal immigrant, earning between 200-400 US dollars per month is definitely better than earning 50-100 dollars at their home (Konrad, 2002, pp.43-48). Moreover, Turkey’s geostrategic advantage as a gateway to reach Western Europe made it a transit and destination country for illegal migration. Eventually, the increasing rates of illegal migration led to the increase in the number of human trafficking rates (Konrad, 2002, pp.43-48). This goes back to the danger and ambiguity of the means of illegal migration and the existence of high percentage of risk of falling into the network of human trafficking (Toktas & Selimoglu, 2019, pp.135-140).

Also, illegal migrants, frequently, use smugglers in order to enter the borders of Turkey, this raises the question of what if those human smugglers turn to be human traffickers and exploit the illegal migrants instead of leaving them after entering the borders of the desired state? In other cases, some smugglers even sell undocumented illegal migrants into situations of prostitution or forced labour to recover their costs (Toktas & Selimoglu, 2019, pp.135-140). The report of the Turkish General Directorate of Security Affairs demonstrated in 2012 that around 318 operations have been conducted to combat human smuggling and human trafficking together without making any distinctions between them. This shows that they are considered “separate but not completely separable issues”. This emphasises the importance of differentiating between human smuggling and human trafficking that was formerly clarified in the first section (Shelley, 2010, pp.8-12).

Another important challenge is the degree of uncertainty of the statistical data utilised. This goes back to the reason that it might be reflecting just a small percentage of reality because most of the trafficked victims don’t prefer to identify themselves as so. Another focal challenge is the need of the

human trafficked victims for special assistance and protection in myriad areas; such as providing shelters, legal counselling, adaptation to the new environment and medical support (Farrell & Pfeffer, 2014, pp. 46-64). For this reason, the Turkish government incorporated many new provisions to meet the victims' needs. These provisions included the issuance of the humanitarian visa, permission to work and the residence permit to enable a legal stay for the victims during their rehabilitation period (Zhidkova & Demir, 2016, pp.30-45).

There was also free medical care provided by the Turkish government to support the human trafficking victims. Not only this, but also the provision of free legal counselling that ensured judicial advocacy in many shelters like Istanbul and Ankara. Moreover, Turkey has started special trainings for its police officers and judicial staff on trafficking identification (Zhidkova & Demir, 2016, pp.30-45). On the flip side, the United States Department of State stated in 2013 that there are, still, several hindrances that might construct a challenge for Turkey's effective protection system. For instance, the prioritization of Turkish citizens over human trafficking victims when it comes to job opportunities (Farrell & Pfeffer, 2014, pp. 46-64). Also, the intimidation—that the victims faced while engaging in criminal prosecution against human traffickers—from the traffickers' defendants is considered a pivotal challenge on the way of making effective protection systems.

Furthermore, the Trafficking in Persons Report stated on 2013 that around two third of the shelters run by Non-governmental Organisations are closed because of the lack of permanent and regular funding. In summary, as this section elaborated, Turkey, continuously, faces many obstacles and challenges through its way in combating human trafficking. However, if its efforts for regional and international cooperation and administrative regulations are taken into consideration, it can be stated that it, at least, aimed at reducing trafficking in persons (Lindstrom, 2005, pp.39-48). In light of this, Turkey has been upgraded from Tier 3 countries to Tier 2 countries with the declaration of the president of the United States in 2003 (Chamie, 2015, pp.77-88).¹⁰

Conclusions:

Human trafficking is becoming one of the most threatening crimes worldwide; thus, it is of a vehement importance to analyse its idiosyncratic sources and reasons to be able to implement comprehensive and effective policies to combat human trafficking. This paper utilised a country-specific case study in order to ensure a better understanding of the issue. According to the IOM's report in 2011, Turkey is the tenth highest human trafficking destination country (Tverdova, 2011, pp. 329–344). For this reason, the paper depended on the analysis of the push factors in the Slavic and the Central Asian countries from one side and the pull factors in Turkey from the other. This analysis supported the main argument that the political instability that led to economic hardship is the main catalyst for the increasing human trafficking rates. This paper aimed to examine the main reasons behind human trafficking in Turkey and the major challenges that it faced while combating human trafficking. The paper argued that the internal conflicts witnessed in the Slavic countries and Central Asia are the pivotal factors behind the increasing human trafficking rates in Turkey. Finally, for recommendations, the paper suggests that both the source and destination countries should collaborate with each other in order to achieve effective solutions for human trafficking. Additionally, the source countries should focus on rebuilding their economy and political stability and eliminate the push factors. On the other hand, the destination countries should focus on enhancing the management of migratory flows and the border security (Tepe & Maviyildiz, 2014, pp. 40-50).

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¹⁰ On 30 June, 2016, the US State Department issued a report on trafficking in persons that categorised countries, according to its efforts to combat human trafficking, into 4 tiers. In which Tier 1 countries are fully compliant with the minimum standards to combat human trafficking, tier 2 countries are in watch list and tier 3 countries are those who don't make any efforts or cooperate in fighting against trafficking (Chamie, 2015, pp.77-88).

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The Shades of Orientalism and Islamophobia towards the Middle East Post-September 11

Merhan Yasser Mohamed Salem

Introduction:

Throughout history, it has been acknowledged by different scholars as well as several historical incidents that the Middle East is being perceived for wrong suppositions by the Western societies. Edward Said, a Palestinian-American political activist and professor of literature, has defined the incorrect representations and imitations of the West towards the Eastern cultures, especially the Middle East, as Orientalism (Said, 1978). Orientalism has existed for very long; however, since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, it has dramatically increased. In addition, Islamophobia has recently grown hugely and rapidly as a result of continuous attacks launched by Islamic organizations as well as the manipulation of Western propaganda. In this paper, the contemporary manifestations of Orientalism towards the Middle East that took place post the 9/11 incident will be explored.

The purpose of this paper is to clarify how Al-Qaeda's terrorist actions of 9/11 have greatly impacted Orientalism in the United States towards Arab-Muslims in the Middle East, and how the Western media had a great role in endorsing the issue as well. The paper is divided into three sections. The first thoroughly explains the terms Orientalism and Islamophobia and how they are interconnected. The second discusses the attacks of 9/11, and how this incident revived the concept of Orientalism. The third views how the Western media has played a huge role in promoting Islamophobia.

This paper argues that the Western media has highly worsened the image of Islam in the United States after 9/11, which has caused rapid and big augmentation in Orientalism towards the Arab Muslim societies in the Middle East. This will be clarified by reviewing Western media, specifically newspapers and magazines such as *the Time*, *the Economist*, *Newsweek*, *U.S. World Report* and *Washington Post* as well as TV shows like "24". The paper as well utilizes the theory of Functionalism to show the interrelation between the Western Media and the arousal of Islamophobia among the public.

Conceptual Framework

A clear definition of Orientalism and Islamophobia is essential in order to present an accurate link between both terms. According to Samiei (2010), in the 19th century, the Orient meant the Middle East or generally the Arab world; China, India or the Far East was not included. Therefore Orientalism mainly aims to analyze and understand Middle Eastern concerns in an academic setting (Samiei, 2010). Along with several scholars, Edward Said (1991) has defined the term Orientalism as a collection of opinions that is identified by a "subtle and persistent Eurocentric prejudice against Arab-Islamic people and their culture" (Said, 1991). He has further argued that Orientalism is a set of incorrect assumptions that are imitative from biased beliefs and standards rather than facts, which causes many Western attitudes and presumptions toward the Middle East. In addition, Said has defined Orientalism as "a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between the Orient and (most of the times) the Occident" (Said, 1991).

On the other hand, Islamophobia is differently defined by many scholars and researchers; yet, the term's essence is basically the same. By literal meaning, Islamophobia is the irrational fear of the people who practice Islam and of the Muslim faith itself. According to Esposito and Mogahed (2007), "Islamophobia was coined to describe a two-stranded form of racism – rooted in both the 'different' physical appearance of Muslims and also in an intolerance of their religious and cultural beliefs" (Esposito and Mogahed, 2007 as cited in Moten, 2010). To Weedon (2004), Islamophobia is "unfounded hostility towards Islam ... unfair discrimination against Muslims individuals and communities" (Weedon, 2004 as cited in Sauced, 2007). That hostility can be expressed through different moves: simple worry, fear, rebuff, disrespect, and hatred of Muslims and Islam (Asal, 2014, Lopez, 2011, and Mohammed, 2014 as cited in Kerboua, 2016). For Zaki (2011), Islamophobia is "endemic in the European psyche". He argues that Islam has a special treatment in Europe as it causes a challenge like

no other in the West (Zaki, 2011 as cited in Wolf, 2015). Consequently, it is concluded that Islamophobia is the main reason behind the distinction between the West and Islam and therefore the Middle East (Marranci & El-Gallal, 2014 as cited in Wolf, 2015).

Post-9/11

Before 9/11, Orientalism supposed Arabs and Muslims as politically passive; nonetheless, following the 9/11 attacks, a ‘new Orientalism’ started to characterize them by “over-politicization and violence” (Arat-Koç, 2014). 9/11 was an incident of four consecutive attacks that has caused thousands of deaths in the United States, and it was committed by the Islamic group Al-Qaeda. Since then, some researchers claimed that the year 2001 was a “transformative moment” in the relationship between Arabs and Americans in which the Americans perceive Arab Muslims as bigoted, violent, and intolerant (Barzegar, 2005 as cited in Altwaiji, 2014).

Thus, the attacks of 9/11 have been a figurative event globally, noticeable by changing East-West relationship, vengeance acts from Americans, and changes in the whole world politics. As a result of this change, terrorism has become the most available term for labeling Arab Muslims, and the representations of this group of people have become more predominant in post-9/11 politics (Altwaiji, 2014).

Functionalism

Before digging into the empirical findings of this research, one must get a clearer understanding of the theoretical base by which it is based upon in order to better-grasp and envision practice or reality. The theory of Functionalism provides the best understanding of the interconnection between the media and the increase of Islamophobia in the United States. It is based on the works of Herbert Spencer, Emile Durkheim, Talcott Parsons, and Robert Merton (Rabe, 2008).

According to Fourie (2001), Functionalism theory views the society as a whole in all aspects. Society is viewed as a human body that has many organs all functioning together. If one organ stops, the others get affected. Functionalism sees the media as a responsible and strong factor that affects the togetherness of the society (Fourie, 2001 as cited in Rabe, 2008). Accordingly, the Western media is a major factor that has basically shaped and directed the opinions and the perspectives of people altogether towards Muslims and Islam in the whole West, and specifically in the United States.

Western Media promoting Islamophobia

After a significant incident like 9/11, the attention to media representations of Islam has strongly increased. The role of the Western media was very huge in influencing Western perception of the Islamic world, and therefore, Islamophobia has become a major concern when discussing the Middle East. Kamalipour (2002) has blamed the Western media for not allowing objectivity and being biased. For instance, new headlines are found in *the Time*, *the Economist*, *Newsweek*, and *U.S. World Report*, including: *The Islamic Threat*, *Should We Fear Islam among Others*, and *America VS. Islam* (Kamalipour, 2002).

In the United States, specifically, the media has created a negative image of Arabs and Muslims through all media outlets, such as cartoons, TV shows, journals and movies. On September 11, 2011, the American lawyer Ann Coulter wrote in Universal Press Syndicate: “This is no time to be precious about locating the exact individuals directly involved in this particular terrorist attack ... We should invade their countries, kill their leaders and convert them to Christianity” (Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting, 2001 as cited in Altwaiji, 2014).

In addition, on the Fox News Channel, Bill O’Reilly, a noticeable American television host, voiced his opinion two days after the attacks: “It doesn’t make any difference who you kill in the process of retaliation against the attacks”. Furthermore, Lawrence Eagleburger, former US Secretary of State, stated to CNN: “There is only one way to begin to deal with people like this, and that is you have to kill some of them even if they are not immediately directly involved in this thing” (Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting, 2001 as cited in Altwaiji, 2014). Thus, in that sense, the American media has paved the way for prejudices and offensive statements targeting Islam and Muslims to regularly appear on TV shows with prominent politicians.

Kamalipour (2002) has as well put the guilt on some newspapers and magazines such as the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, the Christian Science Monitor, and the Washington Post for corrupting the image of Islam to the public; they strongly affect the Americans' understanding of Islam as all of them are very prominent and noticeable sources of news in the United States. These samples demonstrate how the United States has put a gap between Islam and the West and created the idea of "us vs. them" (Swamy, 2013).

The bad representations of Arabs and Islam was not confined in journals; American mass media has focused on all media platforms to illustrate the notion that all Arab Muslims are terrorists who commit numerous murders (Nimer, 2007). For instance, the TV show "24", among many others, has shown an Arab Muslim family as a sleeper cell who was preparing to detonate a nuclear weapon in one of the big cities in America and to kill the president (Nimer, 2007). By relating Arabs and terrorism in this delicate way, the creators of this propaganda are endorsing Islamophobia, which actually Orientalizes Islam as a major threat to America and the whole West.

Conclusions:

The Islamophobic move in Western attitudes towards Middle Eastern politics in recent years has been disastrous, and Americans have confronted the terror of 9/11 and represented this terrible event in their own ways. Instead of creating more peaceful relations and making a better understanding of people in the Middle East, this change has led to new divisions and conflict. Post-9/11, the West, especially the US, has preserved a very negative image towards all Arab Muslims. Moreover, Functionalism has helped in showing the ways in which the media has made the process easier by promoting the worst imitations possible about them. Muslims were being perceived for wrong presuppositions because of what the Western media has chosen to show its people. The paper has shown the ways in which 9/11 was a reason behind the rise of the Orientalising views in the United States towards Arab-Muslims in the Middle East, and the means used by the Western media to promote and further worsen the image of Islam. For future research, it is recommended for scholars to make further researches on the interconnection between Islamophobia and Orientalism as it is a new subject that has opened lots of ideas and discussions.

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Universality and Cultural Relativism in Human Rights: An Alternative Perspective through Ennahda's Lens in Tunisia

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Introduction:

The world had witnessed a turning point in its history when human rights were codified and acknowledged in United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR). Since then, a country's reputation in the international system is determined by how much it respects and enforces human rights. However, one of the main challenges to accepting the universality of human rights still remains the cultural variations between countries on what is acceptable and what is not. From this point on, cultural relativism remained one of the strongest challenges to human rights and in many cases is used as an argument to justify human rights violations (Robinson, n.d). However, advocated by many scholars such as Franz Boas and Jack Donnelly, cultural relativism represents a constant reminder in literature that cultural contexts must be taken into consideration when making policies. They argue that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was constituted by a group of European and American cosmopolitan men in 1948 (Donnelly, 1984). Therefore, the universality of human rights is considered to be a form of moral and cultural imperialism since it represents a single model of what is considered to be acceptable and unacceptable.

This paper aims to further explore the controversy between cultural relativism and universality of human rights from an unconventional scope. It starts by asking the question: is the relationship between cultural relativism and universality always contradicting? Does the answer always have to be either-or? This paper argues that the relationship between the two sides could actually be complementary; by taking the positive aspects of a given culture, this could help in further promoting the universality of human rights. Meaning that having a different –reforming- approach to a specific culture in a given society could lead to having a different perspective on the link between the universality of human rights and cultural relativism.

This paper will be divided into two sections; firstly, it will assess the controversy on human rights nature; whether it ought to be universal or culturally relative, with a special focus on supporting the paper's argument. Secondly, it will analyze the case of Ennahda party in Tunisia and its progressive outlook in regard to its reformist approach to religion and its implications on women's rights in Tunisia. This paper will utilize qualitative methodology. Using secondary data of interpretations of previous scholars on this challenging topic along with articles from conventions like Convention on Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).

1. The Concept of Cultural Relativism and Universality in Human Rights:

Before analyzing the aforementioned controversy, it is essential to adequately define what is meant by "cultural relativism" and "universality" of human rights. According to Donnelly (1984), the two terms could be placed on a continuum, in which radical cultural relativism means that culture is the *sole* source of human rights. It is the origin which people can resort to in order to formulate their moral compasses. On the other hand, radical universality refers to the *complete* rejection of culture in terms of validating rights since culture can be an obstacle to human rights in many cases (Donnelly, 1984). By the virtue of being a human being, it is the right of every individual to have a set of non-derogable rights that no government or culture can alienate them from (Robinson, n.d).

It is essential to highlight that according to Beyers (2017), religion and culture always exist in a close relation, meaning that with time, religion formulates society's concepts. Subsequently, religion becomes the safeguard of a given culture. For the Middle Eastern states, this is mostly the case – with different variations in degrees. Whereas, state's culture and jurisprudence systems are mainly shaped by Islam and Shari'a law (Bassiouni, 2012). For example, how its culturally stigmatizing that people are witnessed not fasting during *Ramadan* [the Holy month] even if it might be acceptable under certain

circumstances in terms of religion. Therefore, religion and culture will be used interchangeably throughout this research due to their intertwining link they share in the Middle East.

According to Laurea (2015), there is no cultural traditions or religion – in essence- naturally rejects the duty to protect human dignity. Deducing from the aforementioned stances, the controversy lies in what should be the reliable source for constituting human rights. Relativists argue that Universalists provide a rigid hierarchal order for several communities with different moral judgments (Donnelly, 1984). Meaning that by imposing a certain code of value, this would inevitably rank different communities according to their how much their code of values accords with the pre-imposed model. Furthermore, proponents of cultural relativism argue that there is a long-standing incompatibility between Western values and non-Western values (Ibhawoh, 2001). Adding that Western cultures focus on the individual as a unit of analysis in terms of validating a norm. Whereas, non-Western cultures place a greater emphasis on the community as a whole as the primary unit of analysis and for making a moral judgment (Ibhawoh, 2001). Therefore, in their view, there is no logical reason that promotes the enforcement of a single code of values since that each culture varies in terms of determining what the ideal way is to secure human dignity.

As to the universal account, they refute one of the relativists' argument by stating that human rights should *solely* focus on the individual rather than the community itself in order not to fall into the trap of the notorious Nazi and Stalinist ideology that were based on collectivism (Shanawez, n.d). In their view, it was collectivism that was the main driving force of mobilizing the masses into wars that eventually led to atrocities, genocides, and gross human rights violations (Ibhawoh, 2001). Therefore, it is essential to change the unit of focus from the “community” or the “nation” to the “individual” as an attempt to restore the human dignity and the value of human life post World War II. In addition, from a Universalist perspective, it is essential to put limits on certain deeds that are not to be done on human beings (Ibhawoh, 2001). Having this limit being universally agreed upon will in fact push for the protection of human dignity even further, even if this agreement is merely theoretical. According to Donnelly (1984), being passive towards such horrific deeds against individuals using the cultural argument would be considered as cowardice. This aforementioned passiveness could in fact be a result of politicizing culture and human rights. Whereas, authoritarian leaders occasionally resort to the “cultural” argument to justify their policies and state practices against their people, which indeed endanger human dignity (Donnelly, 1984). Regardless of the various political, economic, cultural, and regional differences over the globe, scholars paved the way to universalizing human rights which not only made states acknowledge its existence but also made it a state’s moral obligation to abide by them (Donnelly, 2013).

Linking the two endpoints of the spectrum, cultural relativism and universality of human rights could be complementary to each other rather than being portrayed as challenging –sometimes-contradicting terms. Meaning that cultural diversity could be used as a tool in formulating universal human rights that does not oppose any cultural values (Lubbers, 1998). According to Ramcharan (1998), the universality of human rights is actually compatible with cultural diversity when this diversity is deployed to influence the way how human rights are applied in a given society. In other words, cultural diversity could provide a given society the adequate cultural context that is needed to accept the universally acknowledged human rights, in a way that does not contradict with their code of values. It is noteworthy to highlight that by deploying cultural diversity it does not mean rewriting or restructuring a given cultural. Rather, reinterpreting cultures to be able to adapt with the modern world. As Donnelly (1984) argued, cultures cannot be naturally compatible or incompatible with human rights, as it depends on how people interpret and perceive cultures and religions. In addition to the efforts made to further understand the core values of a given culture. All of which is due to the constant dynamic state that human life functions within (Khan, 2017).

2. Women in Islam: The Case of Ennahda in Tunisia:

The issue of women has always been a challenging aspect in human rights discourse and international law in general. Whereas, few conventions viewed the core differences between societies in terms of what is according with their code of values and what is not. One of the most prominent examples is the Convention the Elimination on All Forms of Discrimination (CEDAW). A convention

that was entered into force in 1981 that aimed at eliminating any form of discrimination on any kind against women, defining discrimination as:

“Any distinction, exclusion or restriction whose effects or purposes impair the recognition by women of human rights and freedoms on the basis of full and effective equality in the civil, political, economic, social and cultural fields, or nullify the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of women’s rights regardless of colour, race, religious belief, age, nationality, economic and social conditions, civil status, health, language or disability” (OHCHR, 1979).

Consequently, this provoked a controversy in literature due to its “clash” with non-Western societies, especially traditional Muslim societies. Since the Declaration of Human Rights originated in a western, secular context, Muslim women often get confused when they engage in a discussion that is related to human rights (Hassan, n.d). Consequently, most of Muslim women feel alienated due to the discrimination they face in most –if not all of- Muslim societies. Therefore, efforts should be multiplied to protect human rights, and thus, to protect human dignity.

However, the Western literature often portray Muslim women in the frame of the “oppressed and the deprived” sex in society. This stereotypically discards the large portion of Muslim women who are consensually following the Islamic practices such as *Hijab* while simultaneously struggling with modern-day changes amidst a conservative society. In addition to their inability to identify with the Western culture (Hassan, n.d). Here the state of Tunisia provides a unique example of how culture could provide an adequate context to gradually accept changes in societies that necessitates reinterpretation of religion, which affects society’s culture.

2.1 *Ennahda’s Discourse and Human Rights:*

The Tunisian case demonstrates that having an Islamist party coming to power does not necessarily mean that it would come on the cost of women’s rights and human rights in general (Gondorova, 2014). Founded in 1981, Ennahda Party was inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Rashid Ghannouchi –one of the founders of the party- promoted the moderate Islamic character of the party (Hababou & Amrouche, 2013). After the Jasmine Revolution in 2011, Ennahda returned to the political arena after being banned for years by the former president Ben Ali. Subsequently, secular Tunisian people feared that this return would affect the progress that Tunisia has made in pushing for human rights –especially in women’s rights (Katsipis, 2017).

Ghannouchi had a very progressive outlook on Islam in general and on Tunisian politics in specific. According to Katsipis (2017), Ennahda believed in the power of discussion and pluralism. However, the role of Ennahda in Tunisian politics was not always for change. Being a moderate Islamist party, it had to compromise in certain issues due to the fact that it worked in a coalition government with secular and centrist parties (Gondorova, 2014). Nevertheless, its progression was evident in some cases when it had to revise its stances after receiving some criticisms from feminist groups (Katsipis, 2017). This shows Khan’s argument that differences in cultures and mindsets –regardless of it being Western or not- should exist only to react beneficially to people (Khan, 2017).

Ghannouchi’s discourse was focused on proving that Islam is indeed compatible with freedoms of the individuals and the community (Heneghan, 2011). Heneghan (2011) points out that the key difference between Ghannouchi’s discourse and other puritanical Islamic discourses lies in the interpretation of the legal and moral norms in *Sharia* law. Here lies the main purpose that this paper is trying to highlight, which is the relationship between universality and cultural relativism of human rights highly depends on how culture is interpreted and deployed (Delling, 2004). Tunisia’s Ennahda had a firm belief in the necessity of reforming *Sharia* law and Islamic traditions in order to prove that Islamic core values are in favor of preserving human dignity and it does not clash with the universally acknowledged human rights. Therefore, any law that foster the values that accords with *Sharia* law is welcomed, even if it is not written as a religious law (Heneghan, 2011).

2.2 *Ennahda’s View on Women:*

In regard to women, Ennahda had played a key role in supporting and promoting policies that worked in favor of advancing women’s rights. Their moderate Islamic stance was still evident in cases when they described women as “complementary” to men rather than equal in the Constituent Assembly

(Gondovora, 2014). Consequently, secular women have raised their concerns against Ennahda, worrying that their political power would endanger their freedom. However, their progressive outlook on women remained evident since they came in power post 2011. Whereas, during the 2011 elections, Ennahda complied with the Gender Parity Law that was introduced in May 2011 –prior to the elections (Stepan, 2012). This law mandated that any party that is willing to participate in the elections, its list has to have 50% of its members females, which gives an equal representation to men and women in a political party (Katispis, 2017). Accordingly, Ennahda complied with this law and as a result, out of 49 female MPs in the Constituent Assembly, 42 of them were female Ennahda members (Stepan, 2012). Noting that Ennahda had 89 seats in total. This represents the willingness to comply and adapt with already-existing laws that at first sight seem unconventional to Sharia law but still works in favor of Islamic core values such as justice and equality. Moreover, by complying with this law without any opposition, Ennahda became the first Islamic party in the Middle East to comply and compliment CEDAW convention instead of challenging it, especially in article (7) that states:

“States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the political and public life of the country and, in particular, shall ensure to women, on equal terms with men” (OHCHR, 1979).

More specifically, article (7)(b) states that state parties should ensure women’s right to participate in the formation process of governmental policies and decision-making processes in general (OHCHR, 1979). This proves Ennahda’s progressive outlook on human rights in general and on women’s rights in specific by using the core values of Islam that preserves their Muslim identity and simultaneously complying with the universally acknowledged rights.

Another example in Ennahda’s policies that further highlights this paper purpose is their support and effort to further protect women’s rights on a social level. In 2014, it supported the state’s proposed bill that aims at increasing protection of women from domestic violence (Katispis, 2017). According to Sherwood (2016), Ounissi –a member of Ennahda party- made a statement on behalf of the Islamist party saying:

“Some conservatives might argue that the state should not interfere in the private space [of the family], but when a person’s physical integrity is harmed, the state needs to step in.”

This quotation shows Donnelly’s argument that culture –that is religious by tradition in the Middle East- is what people choose to make of it (Donnelly, 2013). Moreover, Ennahda’s support of this bill represented a strong challenge to the western stereotypes of Islam in regard to human rights in general (Sherwood, 2016). However, by adopting a reformist approach to religion and culture, Ennahda managed to present a unique example of how variations of culture do not contradict with universal values of human rights. Through using the proper approach to culture in regard to universal human rights.

Conclusions:

This paper attempted to add an insightful link in regard to the debate between cultural relativism and universality of human rights. Arguing that their relationship does not always have to be challenging nor conflicting, however, it could be complementary and beneficial at times. In the case of Tunisia, the Islamist party, Ennahda, managed to deploy the Islamic core values to promote the universally acknowledged human rights by using a reformist approach to religion and a progressive attitude in politics. Therefore, this raises the possibility of giving the adequate context in a given society that shows that by using positive aspects of a given culture, cultural variation is no longer a challenge. So long as “protecting human dignity” is the purpose of all arguments made by each side.

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In the Name of the Buddha: Myanmar's Media Plot to Legitimize the Ethnic Cleansing of the Rohingya Through Nationalism

Shereif Akram Barakat

Introduction:

Akin to the debate of “what came first, the chicken or the egg?”, political scientists have often debated on whether states existed before or after the concept of nations came into existence. What is inarguable, however, is the fact that a nation is an essential pillar to the state. Throughout history, nationalism has been an ideology of states that triggered socioeconomic proliferation. However, the case can convolute when a single state governs more than one nation of people. A diverse differentiation of nations, at times of history, has generated a violent nationalist response among one or both sides. A relevant and ongoing case of such a scenario can be examined through Myanmar's Buddhist majority national movement against the state's Rohingya Muslim minority.

The nationalist conflict between the two aforementioned groups has been at the crux of Myanmar's (formerly known as Burma) history. However, the conflict escalated to a tribulating degree in 2016 (Akins, 2018, p.242). This escalation was the result of a violent skirmish between Rohingya militias and Myanmar's military in the Rakhine state – the land of the Rohingya people. Government intervention remains aggressively unrelenting towards the minority. The government, clearly supportive of a unified Buddhist nation, has helped in ousting hundreds of thousands of Rohingyas in an effort to maintain a certain cultural status quo. It has reignited a nationalist fervor within its citizens and took violence to a new level with the Rohingya. Myanmar's government are overt in regard to their nationalist motives, as they continue to utilize the power of media to legitimize the idea of displacing Rohingyas.

This research aims to inquire into the dynamic between nationalism and violence; to understand the determinant of nationalism as a primary cause for violence. To assess the correlation between the two variables, a qualitative approach shall be used, involving a thorough examination of news, organizational reports, photos, and a theoretical framework. Through this approach, the paper aims to answer the question of “In the case of Myanmar, how is nationalism being used as a primary cause of violence against the Rohingya minority?”. Through answering this question, the paper argues that nationalism is the primary cause behind the Rohingya's expulsion from Burmese land. More so, these nationalist inclinations are being thoroughly exacerbated through nationalist media strategies.

The paper will be divided into three sections. The first will establish a theoretical framework that will ensure a coherent understanding of the approach behind the paper and the thoughts utilized by the argument. The second section will scrutinize the long-standing history of contrast and conflict between the Rohingya and the Burmese, as to set a foundational understanding of the case. The third and final section will analyze the nationalist-motivated outbursts of the government through the scope of Herman and Chomsky's Propaganda Model. Both, the pro-Buddhist nationalist and anti-Rohingya nationalist expressions will be displayed in this section. The process behind using such a theory will be better elucidated in the theoretical framework.

Theoretical framework


Nationalism, as defined by Gellner (1992, p.1) in his book *Nations and Nationalism*, is a “primarily a political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent”. In the very same literature, he developed what is now coined Gellner's Theory of Nationalism. The theory, which will be used in this research, propounds the notion that nationalism is initially a sociological and cultural element prior to being a political one. Consequently, Gellner (1992, p.57) believes in the existence of a “high culture” and a “low culture”. It is in the nature of the majority ethnicity to be in control of the politics of the state – thus the high culture – over that of a minority group. He further illustrates nationalism into two principles: nationalist *sentiment* and nationalist

movement. Nationalist sentiment is merely a feeling of anger and insecurity in the presence of an alien group. A nationalist movement is the actualization of such a sentiment.

Perhaps (especially currently) there is no tool quite as efficacious in nationalist movements than that of the media. The theoretical approach to the paper will be using Herman and Chomsky's Propaganda Model from their book, *Manufacturing Consent*. More specifically, the paper shall be implementing the five filters of the model (Herman & Chomsky, 1988, p.2) on the case study. It must be clarified that while the Propaganda Model is primarily concerned with corporate, liberal, mass media, which is not fully applicable to Myanmar's gradually-privatizing political climate, the filters remain relevant to the increasingly strengthening mass media of Myanmar. In essence, the five filters are accurate to the case of Myanmar's nationalist movement.

The five models are as follows: *media ownership*, the concentration of ownership and monopolization of specific media firms; *advertising*, primarily as income to the media and ultimately an inducement to an agenda; *sourcing*, the transmission of specified information by media elites such as governments and corporations; *flak*, the disciplining and punishing of media against that of opposing agendas; and lastly, *fear*, to unite the audience under a common enemy (Herman & Chomsky, 1988, p.8). It must be highlighted that *fear* was formerly named as *communism* in the theory. However, a post-Soviet edition of the book clarified that the concept exists beyond the relevance of the Cold War as *fear*. These five filters will be linked to the case study in regard to how the nationalist government utilizes each filter.

Figure 1, The Propaganda Model



A history of Rohingya-Burmese conflict

In order to construct a nationalist case for the paper, one must first recognize the historical process that has led to such a political milieu. Perhaps the oldest relevant information begins with the origins of Burmese and Rohingya as nations. Prior to being known as the Rohingya, they were the Arakan people; this was the name of their independent kingdom before becoming the Rakhine state of Burma (Leider, 2018, p.2). The very first recorded point of Muslim-Arakan history could be traced back to 1430AD. During this time, there was an ongoing struggle between the Arakan king and the Buddhist Burmese king of the time, Naramaik Hla and Ava respectively (Nurain, 2014, p.3). The Arakan king was expelled and his land seized for years until, with the assistance of a neighboring Muslim Bengali king, he recaptured his land, whilst introducing Islamic Sharia Law (as influenced by the Bengali king).

Muslim influence was further proven through the coin print of the 15th century, featuring Islamic symbols (Leider, 2018, p.4). Once more, the Burmese conquered the Arakan in the late 16th century, leading to a large-scale expulsion of Muslim members of the region. Thus, the ethnocultural pendulum persisted for generations until the intervention of British colonials.

The First Anglo-Burmese War (1824-1826) led to the British occupation of Burma and its subsequent inclusion as a British-Indian province (Yusuf, 2018, p.516). The British colonials utilized the Arakan people's bilingualism and acceptance of British intervention in return for British protection from Burmese aggression. Consequently, the Arakan people became informers and spokespersons for the British occupation. This did not bode well for the occupied Burmese; already in a historical conflict of power between one another, now view the Arakan as traitors to the Burmese nation. The second World War caused a wider divide between the Muslim Arakan minority and that of the Burmese majority. Japan seized control of Burma from the British in 1942 as tag-team skirmishes between British-Arakan and Japo-Buddhist factions ensued (Mang, 2016, p.641). The Arakan people believed in the British promise that an eventual removal of Japan would be rewarded with an autonomous Muslim state. However, the British and Burmese dismissed such a promise as never legitimate (Nurain, 2014, p.4). With the end of the war, and British approval, the Arakan region was forcefully integrated into a now-independent Burmese state (1948). The coming years of cultural and political oppression would become the catalyst for the Arakan people's 'Rohingya' name.

The post-independence constitution of Myanmar claimed itself as a secular state (VIII, 360, a). Nevertheless, it stipulates a preceding article that specifically recognizes the "special position of Buddhism as the faith professed by the great majority of the citizens of the Union" (VIII, 361). The article has not been amended once since the formation of the state. This, alone, is a clear indicator of Myanmar's deep-rooted Buddhist nationalist nature. Once more, Rohingya and Burmese conflict arose, now with the additional iron rule of the Burmese military government. The conflict was heavily oppressive to the Rohingya side, creating the first historical wave of Rohingya refugees. By 1982, the Buddhist-nationalist agenda further radicalized as they introduced the Citizenship Law. In the law, the Burmese government recognized 135 ethnic groups as citizens, and the Rohingya are excluded from this list (Foxeus, 2019, p.663). Thus, the Rohingya are not granted citizenship; they possess no national ID, no formal education, and are pretty much an unrecognized group.

The Citizenship Law culminated in decades of protests, skirmishes, oppression, and forced migrations towards the Rohingya by Buddhist-nationalists. This brings the research back to the present-day Rohingya crisis, a large-scale ethnic cleansing movement by the government of a scale never seen before in its history. One could argue that the Burmese Buddhists were at times only responding to violence instigated by the Rohingya people. In actuality, it must be admitted that the Rohingya have initiated conflict more than once. However, one must equally admit that an ethnicity that is repressed to the severity of not being allowed a national identification nor services will at some point react aggressively.

Violent nationalist sentiment through the use of media

Since the Myanmar military's ethnic cleansing campaign began in 2017, more than 730,000 Rohingya have fled the Rakhine region (Human Rights Watch, 2019). Villages burned, children labored, women raped, and many killed; the Rohingya are caught in a limbo of constant repression and suffering. Egregiously, the Myanmar government is legitimizing these crimes against humanity through invoking a Buddhist-nationalist sentiment (Beech, 2019). The military regime, as Gellner theorized, is constructing a stratagem of soliciting the support of people through a 'high culture vs low culture' mentality. In other words, Buddhism is the righteous and virtuous spiritual following, while Islam is the antagonist to such sentiments. Through this nationalist sentiment, a state-led nationalist movement may surface as envisioned by Gellner. In order to manufacture such an agenda, the state exploited the power of the media to propagate their message. Under the Propaganda Model of Herman and Chomsky, one can clearly see an evident use of the five filters of media as theorized. Through these lenses, the media will glorify the Buddhist nationalist movement whilst erasing the existence of the Rohingya.

Media ownership and advertising

States where democracy seems to be championed will often manipulate large media firms as ‘democratic’ means of disseminating propaganda. Myanmar has recently announced itself as ‘democratized’ this decade, much to the approval of the international world. Despite such claims, it follows the principle of producing undemocratic propaganda through media (Gravers, 2015, p.15). It must be noted that while the state’s demographic is 90% Buddhist, the Buddhist Burmese did not always support the government (Keyes, 2016, p.41). At times of the military rule, large-scale protests and rallies were held against the government by Buddhist demonstrators on many occasions. However, with a now legitimately accepted government, recognized by revered Buddhist monks, the government and the Buddhist faction coexist favourably. Consequently, the propaganda promoted by the government aligns with the sentiment of the Buddhist majority. The Myanmar government relatively controls the more popular news agencies. However, there has been a recent inclusion of private news companies in a bid appear more democratic. This appearance serves as more of a façade, as both types of agencies still display the same propagandist message. Newspapers such as The Myanmar Times, New Light of Myanmar, 7Days, the Voice Daily, and more – a mixture of state-owned and private news companies are examples of news companies that prove the impact of state ownership.

In order to push for its agenda, the government will utilize advertisement as a means of media elevation. Advertisements in the case of Myanmar and the Rohingya is used as a tool for both distractions and enticement. In the case of a distraction, it has advertised an image of itself and of its culture that grabs attention away from the ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya. This serves a distraction from the constant scrutiny of the world as well as its own citizens. A tourism campaign in 2018 titled ‘Myanmar, Be Enchanted’ promoted the beauty and tranquillity of the state, heavily showcasing its Buddhist background (Ministry of Hotels & Tourism).

On the subject of the Rohingya Rakhine state, the government has issued a series of advertisements promoting the potential of investing in the region. Perhaps there is no greater demonstration of such a filter than the state’s creation of the Rakhine State Investment Fair in February of 2019 (Rakhine State Investment Fair 2019). Cited as a “well-organized investment promotion event” on its website, the fair aimed at advertising investment opportunities for the state following years of a struggling local economy. Aung San Suu Kyi, the State Counsellor of the Myanmar government expounded for the “immense potential of this state for peace and prosperity” (Lewis, 2019). Other cases of advertisements and promotions are that of a ‘mega-city’ project being proposed and the opportunity to invest in beaches and hotels (Myint, 2019). Consequently, the heavily publicized fair promoted the interests of boosting the state’s economy and strength to the Burmese majority.

One could strongly claim that the burning of Rohingya villages is a clear attestation to the government displacing Rohingya to seize lands for promotion and profit (Amnesty International, 2017). Only through ethnically cleansing the Rakhine of 730,000 Rohingya inhabitants can one offer investment for new cities or hotels. To legitimize such actions, the Buddhist-nationalist sentiment is provoked once more in order to encourage the agenda of removing Rohingya. Buddhists are reminded of Islam’s opposing beliefs to Buddhism, and of the Rohingya’s cultural distinction to that of the Burmese. As a result, when a citizen examines news on the Rohingya struggle - in conflict with said advertisements - then they will find it to be justified through their preconceived perception of the Rohingya. Perhaps there is no greater dismissal of the ongoing crisis than when Suu Kyi labeled the attention on Rakhine as “focused narrowly on the negative aspects related to problems [in north Rakhine]” (Lewis, 2019). By creating a primary source of income and economic development through the nationalist removal of the Rohingya, forcefully reshaping the Rakhine could be deemed legitimate. Only through a filtered and specified flow of sources can one alter the knowledge of a nation under a false cause.

Sourcing

Sourcing is a critical filter in the process of the Propaganda Model. It dictates what information is spread and the mannerisms of its dispersion. In the case of the Myanmar government, their sourcing of the Rohingya situation is pivotal to the support in a nationalist movement. As a national agenda is legitimized through media ownership and advertising, it is through sourcing that the state may increase

the nationalist sentiment. As of 2017, the government has managed a series of sources that has helped shape the Buddhist-nationalist apparatus. It has accomplished this through a modus operandi of anti-Rohingya news and unfavorable reports on the Rohingya fabricated by the government.

The aforementioned media ownership by the Myanmar government and pro-Buddhist companies has led to a heavily filtered sourcing of anti-Rohingya news. Approved opinion articles on state newspapers such as ‘Who are the So-called Rohingyas?’ (Myint, 2016) and government announcements such as ‘...the term Rohingya as it is an invented terminology’ (Global New Light of Myanmar) showcase the plight against the Rohingya through the sourcing of mainstream media. In the former, the reporter claims “the reason they use the name Rohingya is to hide their Bengali identity...”; the latter, a statement by the ministry of foreign affairs, denounces the claims that the Rohingya are an existent ethnic group within their state. These are only two articles out of many from the Global New Light of Myanmar and other companies. Through such articles, citizens ignorant of the ongoing crisis will develop a nationalist belief that the Rohingya are Muslim outsiders.

The government has gone as far as creating fake governmental reports on the Rohingya, publishing and selling their works across national bookstores. A ‘true news’ book created by the military, used irrelevant and falsified photographs that were claimed to be photos of the Rohingya (McPherson, 2018). One photograph was deemed to be evidence of the Rohingya entering the state from Bangladesh. It was later discovered to be a grainy copy of a photo taken of Hutu refugees fleeing from the Rwandan genocide. The book speaks prosaically of its deep Buddhist history, and the staining of Muslim migrants in its presence. Despite the fallaciousness of the news, both the government and the media’s news are nationalist truths predicated upon lies. The citizens, who are often restricted to only state information, will begin to feel a sentiment towards these false facts and witness a rise in nationalist behaviours.

Flak and the common enemy

To those who recognize the falsity behind the media’s statements, swift repression by the media and by the government awaits them. Media channels and news will denounce any opinion on the Rohingya contradictory to that of the state’s stance, labelling them as anti-Buddhist or even as enemies of the state. Flak, as defined by Herman and Chomsky (1988, p.26), “refers to negative responses to a media statement or program”. With a rise in Buddhist-nationalist sentiment, social media is becoming a lethal tool in inflaming negativity towards the Rohingya (CBS News, 2018). Through the platform of social media, users can share anti-Rohingya sentiments with others. Consequently, this has created a web of hate-speech on social media platforms. For the journalists who scrutinize the actions of the government, many are jailed, tortured, or even killed (Chalmers, 2018). As for Rohingya reporters, the government has blacked out the internet service in their area (Htoon, 2019) in the name of shutting down the common enemy, the Rohingya extremists. Through this common enemy agenda, nationalism rises further, uniting the Buddhist nation behind a violent sentiment.

Conclusions:

Upon a critical and analytical study into the Rohingya crisis, it is indisputable that there is an insurmountable rise in the predominantly Buddhist-nationalist movement of Myanmar. This is due to a plethora of determinants, such as the nations’ disparate historical process, the solidification of an exceptional Buddhist national identity, and the continuous referral of an anti-Rohingya state apparatus. The Burmese people of Myanmar, the dominating ethnic group of the state, were the catalysts necessary for nationalist sentiments. The government exploited media in its forms and variances to promote propaganda against the Rohingya’s inclusion within their borders. This instilled sentiment paved the way for what was deemed a legitimate ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya people. Under the name of protecting Buddhism from Muslim extremists, and preserving a pure Burmese history, the Myanmar government executed a media agenda to ethnically cleanse the Rohingya minority. The probable cause behind it, as much as it is a historical stance, is also for the exploitation of the Rakhine state. Through this entire research, one could forget the tranquility Buddhism preaches when stained by such nationalist vehemence.

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Annexes

Annex No. 1: Conference Agenda

| Time | Speaker/ Panel | Description |
|-----------------------------------|---|--|
| 9:00 | Registration | |
| 9:15: | Prof. Ahmed Hamad <i>President of The British University in Egypt.</i> | |
| Opening Session | Professor Wadouda Badran <i>Dean, Faculty of Business Administration, Economics and Political Science</i> | |
| | Professor Hadia Fakhreldin <i>Vice Dean, Faculty of Business Administration, Economics, and Political Science</i> | |
| 9:30 to 11:00 | First Student Panel: <i>International Interactions: Ideas, Theories and Policies: Opening Session</i> | <p>9:30: Opening statements by Chair: Professor Amany Khodair</p> <p>9:40: First speaker: Fatemah Mosaad Hussein: <i>"Secularism Between the East and the West: Taha Hussien's Secular Thought versus France's Secular System"</i></p> <p>9:50: Second speaker: Farida Ehab El Atriss: <i>"New Wars: The Evolution of the Anonymous Movement and the International Community's Response, Through a Constructivist Analysis"</i></p> <p>10:00: Third Speaker: Rola Magdi Elkamash: <i>"The European Union: Liberal on the Inside, Mercantilist on the Outside"</i></p> <p>10:10: Fourth Speaker: Sarah Hisham Salah Ali: <i>"The Impact of Public Opinion on Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Strengths and Limitations"</i></p> <p>10:20: Discussion and comments by Professor Sally Khalifa Isaac</p> |
| 11:00 to 12:40 | Second Students Panel: <i>Foreign Intervention</i> | <p>11:00: Opening statements by Chair: Professor Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (Honorary Guest)</p> <p>11:10: First speaker: Feras ElShawarby: <i>"Failed States and the Colonial Powers in Sub- Saharan Africa: Colonial Heritage and International Dominance"</i></p> <p>11:20: Second speaker: Mariam Ahmed Abd El-Motaleb: <i>"Syria as a Battleground for Russian Interests"</i></p> <p>11:30: Third Speaker: Mennatallah Ehab: <i>"To What Degree Does Globalization Limit the Autonomy of the State?"</i></p> <p>11:40: Fourth Speaker: Rita Youssef: <i>"The Decision Environment and its Effect on the Quality of the Israeli Decisions During the 2006 War"</i></p> <p>11:50: Discussion and Comments: Dr. Al Moataz Bellah Abdel Fattah & Dr. Ahmed Mahdi</p> <p>12:10: Concluding Remarks of the Panel: Professor Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (Honorary Guest)</p> |
| 12:40: Twenty-Minute Break | | |
| 1:00 to 2:30 | Third Students Panel: <i>Human Rights</i> | <p>1:00: Opening statements by Chair: Dr. Nikolaos Nikolakakis</p> <p>1:10: First speaker: Mariam Hussein Kamal: <i>"Human Trafficking: A modern Form of Slavery: A Case Study of the Turkish Efforts"</i></p> |

Towards Combating Sex Trafficking"

1:20: Second speaker: **Merhan Yasser Salem:** *"The Shades of Orientalism and Islamophobia: Post-September 11"*

1:30: Third Speaker: **Nadine Khaled Bahgat Rashid:** *"Universality and Cultural Relativism in Human Rights: An Alternative Perspective Through Ennahda's Lens"*

1:40: Fourth Speaker: **Sherif Akram Barakat:** *"In the Name of the Buddha: Myanmar's Media Plot to Legitimize the Ethnic Cleansing of the Rohingya Through Nationalism"*

1:50: Discussion and comments by **Dr.Richard Gauvain**

2:10: Q&A Session

2:30 Thank You Notes and End of Conference

Annex No. 2: Members of the Organizing Committee

Prof. Amany Khodair
Prof. Sally Khalifa Isaac
Dr. Rasha Mansour
Dr. Ahmed Mahdi
Mr. Omar Aboubaker
Ms. Jasmin Makhoulf
Ms. Mereet Hany Adly
Ms. Youstina Magdy

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